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Abstract
I study a regression model in which one covariate is an unknown function of a latent
driver of link formation in a network. Rather than specify or fit a parametric network
formation model, I introduce a new method based on matching pairs of agents with
similar columns of the squared adjacency matrix, the ijth entry of which contains
the number of other agents linked to both agents i and j. The intuition behind this
approach is that for a large class of network formation models the columns of this matrix
characterize all of the identifiable information about individual linking behavior. In
the paper, I first describe the model and formalize this intuition. I then introduce
estimators for the parameters of the regression model and characterize their large
sample properties.
1 Introduction
Most economic outcomes are not determined in isolation. Rather agents are influenced by the
behaviors and characteristics of other agents. For example, a high school student’s academic
performance might depend on the attitudes and expectations of that student’s friends and
family (see generally Akerlof and Kranton 2002, Austen-Smith and Fryer Jr 2005, Marianne
2011, Sacerdote 2011).
Incorporating this social influence into the right-hand side of an economic model may
be desirable when the researcher wants to understand its impact on the agents’ outcomes
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or when it confounds the impact of another explanatory variable such as the causal effect
of some nonrandomized treatment. For instance in the above example, the researcher may
want to learn the causal effect of a tutoring program on academic performance in which
program enrollment and counterfactual academic performance are both partially determined
by family expectations. However, in many cases the relevant social influence is not observed
by the researcher and so it cannot simply be included as a covariate in the model. That is in
the above example, the researcher does not have access to data on the family expectations
that confound the causal effect of the tutoring program and thus cannot control for this
variable using conventional methods.
One solution to this problem is to collect social network data and presume that the
unknown social influence is revealed by agent linking behavior in the network (see generally
Jackson 2008; 2014, Blume, Brock, Durlauf, and Ioannides 2010, Boucher and Fortin 2015,
Chandrasekhar 2015, Graham 2015, de Paula 2016, Kranton 2017). For instance in the
above example, the researcher might observe pairs of students who identify as friends and
believe that students with similar reported friendships have similar family expectations. It
is not immediately clear, however, how one might actually use network data to account for
unobserved social influence in practice, since the total number of ways in which agents can
be linked in a network is typically large relative to the sample size.
The main contribution of this paper is to demonstrate one way in which network data can
be used as a substitute for this sort of unobserved heterogeneity in the context of a partially
linear regression model. The paper consists of three steps: first, I specify a joint regression
and network formation model; second, I establish sufficient conditions for the parameters of
the regression model to be identified; third, I provide estimators for these parameters and
characterize their large sample properties.
In the first step, described further in Section 2.1, I specify a model in which latent social
characteristics determine both the social influence in the regression and links in the network.
The model draws upon previous work by Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013), Chan
(2014), Hsieh and Lee (2014), Johnsson and Moon (2015), and Arduini, Patacchini, and Rainone
(2015). However, these authors rely on relatively strong functional form assumptions on the
network formation model that when wrong may lead to invalid inferences about the param-
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eters of the regression model. My method does not require such assumptions.
An assumption I do require is that the network links are conditionally independent given
the agents’ social characteristics. This assumption is not uncommon in the network forma-
tion literature (see Bickel and Chen 2009, Graham 2017, as well as the above literature).
But when taken as a literal description of the agents’ incentives to form links, the model
does preclude behavior thought to characterize many economic networks (c.f. Sheng 2012,
Chandrasekhar and Jackson 2014, Leung 2015, Menzel 2015, Ridder and Sheng 2015, Badev
2017, Mele 2017). In particular, under the random utility interpretation for this model
outlined by Candelaria (2016), the utility two agents receive from forming a link cannot
explicitly depend on the existence of links between other agents in the sample.
In Section 2.3, I propose an alternative interpretation in which the model is viewed as a
reduced form description of the within-equilibrium distribution of network links generated
by some economic game, potentially unknown to the researcher. The benefit of this inter-
pretation is that it does not require the researcher to make strong assumptions about the
agents’ incentives to form links in the network. A similar representation argument underlies
the estimation strategy of Menzel (2015). However, my interpretation also relies on the
additional argument that, for the purposes of identifying and estimating the parameters of
a the regression model, conflating the true network formation process with its reduced form
approximation is, in many cases, without loss of generality. A formal presentation of this
argument, its limitations, and an example can be found at the end of Section 2.3.
In the second step, described further in Sections 2.2 and 3.2, I provide sufficient condi-
tions for the parameters of the regression model to be identified without strong functional
form restrictions on the network formation model. The idea behind these conditions is that
in a regression model in which the outcome depends on observed explanatory variables and
an unobserved social influence term, the model is identified if agents with similar social char-
acteristics have similar social influences but different explanatory variables. An innovation
of this paper is the use of network distance, a novel measure of similarity between agents’
social characteristics, to formalize these conditions make them straightforward to apply in
practice.
To illustrate the use of these conditions, I study the identification of network peer effects
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in a variation on the linear-in-menas model of Bramoulle´, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) and
demonstrate that, in the setting of this paper, the network peer effects are not generally
identified in the presence of unknown social influence. Similar results have been found in
the related group peer effects literature (for instance, Manski 1993, Graham and Hahn 2005,
Graham 2008) in which a group peer effect is not generally distinguishable from unobserved
heterogeneity at the group level. More details about this example can be found at the end
of Section 2.2.
In the third step, also described further in Section 2.2, I propose estimators for the
parameters of the regression model based on matching pairs of agents with similar columns
of the squared adjacency matrix. Here, the adjacency matrix of a network is a matrix with
the number of rows and columns equal to the number of agents. It contains a 1 in the ijth
entry if agents i and j are linked and a 0 otherwise. The squared adjacency matrix refers
to the matrix square of the adjacency matrix and agent i’s column of the squared adjacency
matrix is the ith column of this matrix.
The rationale for this matching procedure follows from a new result in this paper that, un-
der mild regularity conditions on the network formation model, agents with similar columns
of the squared adjacency matrix necessarily have similar social characteristics, as mea-
sured by network distance. The logic is related to recent arguments from the link predic-
tion literature (in particular Bickel, Chen, and Levina 2011, Rohe, Chatterjee, and Yu 2011,
Zhang, Levina, and Zhu 2015), though to my knowledge the main result and its application
to the identification and estimation of the parameters of a regression model are original. A
formal statement of this result can be found in Section 3.3.1.
The estimators are simple to compute and, under certain regularity conditions, are consis-
tent and asymptotically normal. In particular, the estimators can be approximated by ratios
of U-statistics, so that their large sample distributions can be derived analytically using argu-
ments from Serfling (2009) (see also Powell, Stock, and Stoker 1989, Ahn and Powell 1993)
and approximated using random sampling methods such as the bootstrap of Efron (1979)
(see also Bickel and Freedman 1981, Bhattacharyya and Bickel 2015). Details can be found
in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
This analysis, however, is somewhat complicated by the fact that the matching variable
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is a vector of dimension equal to the sample size. As a result, some constructions commonly
used in the literature to characterize the rate of convergence and limiting distribution of the
estimators, such as the density function of the matching variable, are not well defined in my
setting. To resolve this problem, I appeal to arguments from the literature on functional
nonparametrics (for instance, Ferraty, Mas, and Vieu 2007, Hong and Linton 2016), in which
this density function is replaced with a more general notion of a small ball probability.
This construction can then be characterized using tools from the literature on dense graph
limits (see generally Lova´sz 2012). The dimension of the matching variable also complicates
correcting the bias of the slope parameter of the regression model, for which I propose a
variation on the jackknife method of Honore´ and Powell (1997). Details about the large
sample approximations for the estimators can be found in Section 3.3.3.
Section 4 contains simulation evidence from three Monte Carlo experiments and Section 5
concludes by discussing how the method of this paper might be extended to various nonlinear
and nonparametric regression models, or to allow for weighted networks, directed networks,
or networks with exogenous link covariates. I leave the formal study of these extensions to
future work.
2 Model and Estimators
Section 2.1 provides an overview of the model. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the main
identification conditions and proposed estimators. Section 2.3 provides a discussion of the
conditional independence assumption in the network formation model.
2.1 Model
Let agent i represent an arbitrary agent from a large population. Associated with agent i
is an outcome yi ∈ R, a vector of observed explanatory variables xi ∈ Rk for some positive
integer k, and an unobserved index of social characteristics wi ∈ [0, 1]. The three are related
by the following regression model
yi = xiβ + λ(wi) + εi (1)
5
in which β ∈ Rk is an unknown slope parameter, λ is an unknown Lebesgue measurable
function, and εi is an idiosyncratic error with E[εi|xi, wi] = 0. I emphasize that the semilinear
structure of (1) is used to simplify the exposition of the paper; it is possible to extend the
logic of this paper to various nonlinear and nonparametric regression models.
The parameters of interest are β and agent i’s social influence term λ(wi). In this paper,
the social influence function λ : [0, 1] → R is not a parameter of interest because it is not
separately identified from wi. It is thus without loss to normalize the marginal distribution
of wi to be standard uniform. Apart from this normalization, the two main identification
conditions given in Section 2.2, and various regularity conditions in Section 3, the joint
distribution of xi and wi is left unrestricted. In fact, under these conditions β and λ(wi)
may be identified even if one of the random variables is a deterministic function of the other.
I assume the researcher draws a random sample of n agents from the population. The
agents in this sample are described by the sequence of independent and identically distributed
random variables {yi, xi, wi}ni=1, although the researcher only observes {yi, xi}ni=1 as data. In
order to identify and estimate β and λ(wi), the researcher also observes D, an n×n stochastic
binary adjacency matrix corresponding to an unlabeled, unweighted, and undirected random
network between the n agents. The existence of a link between agents i and j is determined
by the following model
Dij = 1{ηij ≤ f(wi, wj)}1{i 6= j} (2)
in which f is an unknown symmetric Lebesgue measurable function and {ηij}ni,j=1 is a sym-
metric matrix of unobserved scalar disturbances with independent upper diagonal entries
that are mutually independent of {xi, wi, εi}ni=1. In this paper, the marginal distribution of
ηij is not separately identified from f and so is also normalized it to be standard uniform.
Network formation is represented by
(
n
2
)
conditionally independent Bernoulli trials in
which the probability that agents i and j link is proportional to f(wi, wj). Examples of (2) in
the network formation literature include Holland and Leinhardt (1981), Duijn, Snijders, and Zijlstra
(2004), Krivitsky, Handcock, Raftery, and Hoff (2009), Chatterjee, Diaconis, and Sly (2011),
McCormick and Zheng (2012), Dzemski (2014), Graham (2017), Candelaria (2016) and Nadler
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(2016). Many of these authors also consider directed networks, weighted networks, or include
exogenous link covariates in the right hand side of (2). Such extensions are also possible in
my setting but are not pursued in this paper.
One way to interpret (2) is as a description of how a researcher might use a subjective
survey question to elicit information about a nonrandom relationship between two agents.
For instance, the researcher might survey a random sample of agents about whether or
not they identify as friends with Dij = 1 if agents i and j report a friendship, f(wi, wj)
the frequency of positive social interactions between them, and ηij an error that allows
for heterogeneity in i and j’s subjective interpretation of whether or not the nature of
their interactions qualifies as a friendship. This interpretation of the network formation
model is not behavioral, in the sense that it takes the social interactions as deterministic
and attributes all of the randomness in D to either sampling or measurement error. In
Section 2.3, I provide alternative interpretations of the model that are behavioral, in that
they consider the randomness in D to be the result of agents’ stochastic preferences over
particular configurations of network links.
The following three examples illustrate applications of this model to the literature.
Example 1 (Network Peer Effects): Let yi be student GPA, xi be a vector of student
covariates (age, grade, gender, etc.), and Dij = 1 if students i and j are friends and 0
otherwise. One extension of the Manski (1993) linear-in-means peer effects model to the
network setting is
yi = xiβ + E[xj |Dij = 1, wi]ρ1 + E[yj|Dij = 1, wi]ρ2 + λ(wi) + εi
Dij = 1{ηij ≤ f(wi, wj)}1{i 6= j}
in which wi measures student i’s social ability, E[xj |Dij = 1, wi] denotes the expected
covariates of agent i’s friends given their social ability, E[yj|Dij = 1, wi] denotes the
expected GPA of agent i’s friends given their social ability, and λ(wi) is the direct effect of
social ability on GPA (for instance, students with more social ability may pay more
attention in class). Identification problems stemming from the fact that all three terms are
functions of wi is discussed in Section 2.2. Bramoulle´, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) consider
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a similar model with λ(wi) = 0 and Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013), Chan (2014),
Hsieh and Lee (2014), Johnsson and Moon (2015), and Arduini, Patacchini, and Rainone
(2015) consider related models with additional functional form restrictions on λ or f .
In Example 1, the use of the expected peer outcomes E[yj|Dij = 1, wi] instead of their
empirical counterparts
∑
j yjDij/
∑
j Dij reflects a particular interpretation about the model
and sampling procedure: the peer groups that determine agent behavior are not related to the
random sample drawn by the researcher. In contrast, the above literature generally assumes
that the researcher has sampled all of the other agents whose outcomes and characteristics
influence agent i’s outcome. I believe the former is a more accurate description about how
network data is sampled in many applications, including The National Longitudinal Study
of Adolescent to Adult Health (Add Health) typically used to study network peer effects,
although I leave a formal comparison of the two approaches to future work.
Example 2 (Information Diffusion): Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, and Jackson
(2013) model household participation in a microfinance program in which information
about the program diffuses over a social network. The authors control for household-level
heterogeneity in program information by specifying and simulating a joint model of
information diffusion and program participation. To simplify the example, I suppose that
the authors instead have access to a continuous measure of program participation
(extending my method to nonlinear models is straightforward, but left to future work) and
propose the alternative
yi = xiβ + λ(wi) + εi
Dij = 1{ηij ≤ f(wi, wj)}1{i 6= j}
In this example, i indexes participating households, yi is a continuous measure of
participation (amount of money borrowed), xi is a vector of observed household
characteristics (caste, religion, wealth, etc.), Dij = 1 if households i and j have a social
connection, and wi are characteristics that influence social network formation (for example,
villager gregariousness). λ(w) is the direct effect of villager gregariousness on program
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participation (more gregarious villagers might all else equal learn more about the program
and thus participate more).
Example 3 (Research Productivity): Ductor, Fafchamps, Goyal, and van der Leij
(2014) study a model of research productivity in which a researcher’s current publication
quality depends on past quality, researcher covariates, and a vector of network statistics
derived from a coauthorship network (in which two researchers are linked if they have
previously been coauthors) including agent degree, eigenvector centrality, etc. The authors
experiment with several different models of productivity, including various combinations of
network statistics. An alternative that treats the unknown combination of network
statistics as unobserved social influence is
yi = xiβ + λ(wi) + εi
Dij = 1{ηij ≤ f(wi, wj)}1{i 6= j}
in which wi indexes researcher i’s participation in various academic communities (for
instance, fields of study, physical locations, etc.) and λ(wi) is the direct effect of associating
with a particular collection of communities (as indexed by wi) on research productivity.
The idea that a vector of network statistics might be represented by a function of the
agent’s latent social characteristics is explained in more detail in Section 2.3.
2.2 Main Identification Conditions and Estimators
This section motivates the main identification conditions and estimators for β and λ(wi),
deferring formal results to Section 3. I first focus on the identification and estimation of
β and treat λ and f as nuisance functions. If the social characteristics were observed, (1)
corresponds to the partially linear regression of Engle, Granger, Rice, and Weiss (1986) and
the identification and estimation of β is well understood (see Chamberlain 1986, Powell 1987,
Newey 1988, Robinson 1988, Ritov and Bickel 1990). If the social characteristics were un-
observed but identified by the distribution of D (that is, wi 6= w′i implies
∫
τ∈A f(wi, τ)dτ 6=∫
τ∈A f(w
′
i, τ)dτ for some A ⊆ [0, 1] with nonzero Lebesgue measure), one might extend these
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methods by replacing the social characteristics with empirical analogs as in Ahn and Powell
(1993), Ahn (1997), and Hahn and Ridder (2013). This approach is taken by Arduini, Patacchini, and Rainone
(2015) and Johnsson and Moon (2015).
However, in this paper I do not assume that the social characteristics are either observed
or identified by the distribution of D. Instead, I propose to identify and estimate β by
matching pairs of agents with similar network types (an object I define below). This idea is
motivated by the following two observations.
The first observation is that β is identified if λ(wi) depends on wi only through the
network type f(wi, ·) : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] and if there is excess variation in the distribution of xi
not explained by f(wi, ·). I will explain what I mean by these conditions first, and then the
logic behind them. The network type f(u, ·) gives the conditional probability that an agent
with social characteristics u links with agents of every other social characteristic in [0, 1].
To compare two agents’ network types, I use network distance, which is defined to be the
following pseudometric on the space of social characteristics
d(u, v) = ||f (u, ·)− f (v, ·) ||2 =
(∫
(f (u, τ)− f (v, τ))2 dτ
)1/2
In words, d(u, v) is the integrated squared difference in the network types of agents with social
characteristics u and v. The main identification conditions are then that β is identified if
E[(xi − xj)′(λ(wi) − λ(wj))|d(wi, wj) = 0] = 0 and E[(xi − xj)′(xi − xj)|d(wi, wj) = 0] is
positive definite. A formal definition of these conditional expectations is provided in Section
3.1.
The logic behind the first identification condition is that under (2), f(wi, ·) describes the
totality of information that the distribution of D contains about wi. That is, if d(wi, wj) = 0
then there is no feature of the network that can distinguish between wi and wj. Agents i
and j will have the same probability of being connected in any particular configuration of
links, and thus will have the same distribution of degrees, eigenvector centralities, average
peer characteristics, and any other agent-specific statistic of D (see Theorem B in Section
2.3). If E[(xi − xj)′(λ(wi) − λ(wj))|d(wi, wj) = 0] 6= 0, then matching agents with similar
network types will not control for all of the unobserved heterogeneity in (1), but under (2)
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there is no further information in the distribution of D that can identify it. Additionally,
when wi is identified by the distribution of D, d(wi, wj) = 0 implies |wi − wj| = 0, so that
E[(xi − xj)′(λ(wi) − λ(wj))|d(wi, wj) = 0] = 0 holds by definition. As a consequence, this
first identification condition is more general than that imposed by the literature cited in
Section 2.1.
The logic behind the second identification condition is that ifE[(xi−xj)′(xi−xj)|d(wi, wj) =
0] is not positive definite, then there is a dimension of the covariate space such that all of
the variation in yi can be explained by wi regardless of β. Thus β is not identified, because
any value of β along this dimension is consistent with the data. An example of a model that
fails this condition is the network peer effects model of Example 1, which I discuss below.
The second observation is that the average squared difference in the ith and jth columns
of the squared adjacency matrix (D×D) can be used to bound d(wi, wj). The logic has two
steps. First, there exists another pseudometric δ on the space of social characteristics such
that d(wi, wj) can be bounded in terms of δ(wi, wj). Second, δ(wi, wj) can be consistently
estimated by the root average squared difference in the ith and jth columns of the squared
adjacency matrix
δˆij =
 1
n
n∑
t=1
(
1
n
n∑
s=1
Dts(Dis −Djs)
)21/2 (3)
Here, the codegree
∑n
s=1DtsDis gives the number of other agents that are linked to both
agents i and t, {∑ns=1DtsDis}nt=1 is the collection of codegrees between agent i and the other
agents in the sample, and δˆij gives the root average squared difference in i’s and j’s collection
of codegrees. Similar relationships between configurations of network moments and the
distribution of links are also used by Bickel, Chen, and Levina (2011), Lova´sz and Szegedy
(2010), Rohe, Chatterjee, and Yu (2011), Zhang, Levina, and Zhu (2015), but to different
ends.
The two observations indicate that when the ith and jth columns of the squared adjacency
matrix are similar and the identification conditions for β hold then (yi − yj) and (xi −
xj)β + (εi − εj) are approximately equal. Under additional regularity conditions, β is then
11
consistently estimated by the pairwise difference estimator
βˆ =
(
n−1∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
(xi − xj)′(xi − xj)K
(
δˆ2ij
hn
))−1(n−1∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
(xi − xj)′(yi − yj)K
(
δˆ2ij
hn
))
(4)
in which K is a kernel density function and hn a bandwidth parameter depending on the
sample size.
This estimator for β can be used to construct an estimator for λ(wi) when the first main
identification condition is strengthened to E
[
(λ(wi)− λ(wj))2 |d(wi, wj) = 0
]
= 0. Under
this assumption, consistency of βˆ, and additional regularity conditions, λ(wi) is consistently
estimated by the following nonparametric regression of the residuals (yi − xiβˆ) on wi using
differences in the columns of the squared adjacency matrix δˆij .
λ̂(wi) =
(
n∑
t=1
K
(
δˆ2it
hn
))−1( n∑
t=1
(
yt − xtβˆ
)
K
(
δˆ2it
hn
))
(5)
This logic might also be used to estimate other network effects. For instance, another
extension of the Manski (1993) linear-in-means peer effects model to the network setting is
yi = xiβ + E[xi|wi]ρ1 + E[yi|wi]ρ2 + λ(wi) + εi, in which E[xi|wi] is the mean covariates
of agent i given his social characteristics. This model differs from that in Example 1 in
that agents react to their expected characteristics rather than the expected characteristics of
their friends. While the two models are identical in Manski’s setting, when linking behavior
is heterophilic, they can have very different implications. When λ(·) = 0, one could use
{δˆij}i 6=j to estimate E[xi|wi] and E[yi|wi], and then estimate ρ1 and ρ2 by regressing λ̂(wi)
on Ê[xi|wi] and Ê[yi|wi].
I now discuss the identification of β and λ(wi) in the context of Example 1.
Example 1 (Network Peer Effects): In the network peer effects model
yi = xiβ + E[xj |Dij = 1, wi]ρ1 + E[yj|Dij = 1, wi]ρ2 + λ(wi) + εi
Dij = 1{ηij ≤ f(wi, wj)}1{i 6= j}
the parameter β is identified if the two main identification conditions hold. For example, β
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is identified if a student’s expected number of network links (
∫
f(wi, τ)dτ) is a monotonic
function of social ability, but students with a given social ability do not all have the same
observed charactersitics. The parameters ρ1 and ρ2 are not generally seperately identified
from λ, since E[xj |Dij = 1, wi] = E[xjDij |wi]/E[Dij |wi] is a function of wi. In fact, the
model violates the second identification condition since
E[xj |Dij = 1, wi] =
∫
E[xj |wj = w]f(wi, w)dw/
∫
f(wi, w)dw
and d(wi, wi′) = ||f(wi, ·) = f(wi′, ·)||2 = 0 implies
E[(E[xj |Dij = 1, wi]−E[xj |Di′j = 1, wi′])2 |d(wi, wi′) = 0] = 0
Identification of ρ1 and ρ2 in this model requires additional assumptions on λ or f .
2.3 Discussion
This section discusses two motivations for the proposed model and main identification con-
ditions. The first motivation is due to Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) and Jackson
(2014), who view wi as literally corresponding to an exogenous agent social attribute, such
as socioeconomic status or social ability. Agent i’s incentive to form links and his social
influence in the regression model are both determined by wi. For instance, a student’s so-
cioeconomic status might determine both his friendships and his parent’s expectations about
academic performance. Under this interpretation, the network is relevant because it allows
the researcher to identify the agents’ social characteristics (up to the equivalence class de-
fined by d) and incorporate them into the regression model. The network formation model
also admits a natural random utility interpretation (see Candelaria 2016, for details).
That the unobserved social characteristics can be identified by the columns of the squared
adjacency matrix requires that the true network formation model is of the form given in (2).
Probably the most contentious assumption in this model is conditional indepedence: that a
link between agents i and j only depends on that between k and l through their social char-
acteristics {wi, wj, wk, wl}. This assumption is used by the literature cited in Section 2.1, but
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is violated in settings where some link formation is endogenous (that is, the probability two
agents form a link partly depends on the existence of other links in the network as in Sheng
2012, Leung 2014; 2015, Ridder and Sheng 2015, Menzel 2015, Mele and Zhu 2017). If the
network formation model exhibits endogenous link formation, then under this motivation
the columns of the squared adjacency matrix do not necessarily reveal any meaningful in-
formation about the underlying social charateristics, and the methodology of this paper will
not be valid. Recent work by Griffith (2016) and Badev (2017) consider parametric models
of social interaction and network formation that, among other things, explicitly account for
endogenous link formation. The extent to which the parametric structure in their models
can be relaxed as in (2) is, to my knowledge, an open question.
In the second motivation, the social characteristics do not literally correspond to exoge-
nous agent attributes. Instead, (2) is a reduced form description of the conditional distribu-
tion of network links implied by a structural network formation game with endogenous link
formation on a population that is large relative to the sample size. This interpretation relies
on two main results that I summarize first and then explain below.
The first result is that many network formation models from the economics literature
generate a conditional distribution of network links that can also be described by a model
of the form given in (2). The second result (original to this paper) is that many network
statistics from the economics literature can be approximated by functionals of the network
types implied by this reduced form approximation. When the network formation game occurs
on a population that is large relative to the size of the sample observed by the researcher,
any regression model in which the outcome depends on a vector of observed covariates and
an unknown combination of network statistics (satisfying certain regularity conditions) is
closely approximated by (1), satisfying the first main identification condition of Section 2.2.
I first explain the results below, describe the interpretation in more detail, and then illustrate
the argument using the Example 3 from Section 2.1.
The first result is that if the network formation model is jointly exchangeable then the
equilibrium distribution of network links is described by (2) for some choice of f and {wi}ni=1.
In this paper, a network formation model is characterized by the joint distribution of the ele-
ments of a random n×n adjacency matrix {Dij}i 6=j (which may be infinite dimensional), and
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is jointly exchangeable if for any automorphism π on {1, ..., n}, {Dij}i 6=j and {Dπ(i)π(j)}i 6=j
are equal in distribution. Basically, joint exchangeability imposes that the distribution of
network links does not depend on how the agents are indexed. Almost all of the network
formation models cited in this paper satisfy joint exchangeability.
The following theorem is generally attributed to Hoover (1979), Aldous (1981) and
Kallenberg (1989), although this particular version is Corollary III.6 to Theorem III.2 of
Orbanz and Roy (2015)
Theorem A: The network formation model characterized by {Dij}i 6=j is jointly
exchangeable if and only if there exist iid uniform random variables w, {wi}ni=1 and {ηij}i 6=j
that are mutually independent of each other and a measurable function f such that
Dij =d 1{ηij < f(w,wi, wj)} (6)
The theorem is similar in spirit to arguments made by Leung (2015), Menzel (2015),
Ridder and Sheng (2015), Mele and Zhu (2017), who broadly view (6) as either a limiting
game associated with a model with endogenous link formation or as a reduced form de-
scription of the within-equilibrium distribution of links between agents (the random variable
w, which indexes variation at the population level, captures variation due to equilibrium
selection). Conditional on w, (6) is equivalent to (2), and all of the arguments of this paper
can be applied. In what follows, I refer to the function f(w, ·, ·) as the reduced form linking
function and f(w,wi, ·) as agent i’s reduced form network type.
The second result is that even if (6) does not literally describe the structural network
formation game that generated the distribution of network links, the main identification
conditions of this paper may still be satisfied if the social influence in the regression model
can be described by a combination of agent-specific network statistics in the following sense.
Let λ(D, i) denote an arbitrary agent-specific network statistic, that is a real-valued
function of an adjacency matrix D and an agent index i from some network on m agents,
satisfying two assumptions. The first assumption is about symmetry: for any automorphism
π on {1, ..., m} such that π(i) = i, λ(D, i) = λ({Dπ(s),π(t)}s 6=t, i). In words, the assump-
tion says that the network statistic for agent i does not depend on how the other agents
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are indexed. The second assumption is about bounded deviations: |λ(D, i)− λ(D′, j)| =
Op
(
1
m
∑
t6=i,j |Dit −D′jt|+ 1m2
∑
s,t6=i,j |Dst −D′st|
)
. This assumption states that altering one
of agent i’s links in the network only changes the statistic for agent i by a factor of O
(
1
m
)
while altering any other link only changes it by O
(
1
m2
)
. Most network statistics from the
economics literature satisfy these conditions, including average degree and eigenvector cen-
trality.
Theorem B: Suppose λ(D, i) satisfies the above symmetry and bounded deviations
assumptions. Further suppose (6) holds. Then
|λ(D, i)− λ(D, j)| ≤ C||f(w,wi, ·)− f(w,wj, ·)||2 +Op
(
m−1/2
)
for some C depending on f and w.
The proof of Theorem B can be found in the Appendix. The choice of 1/m in the bounded
deviations condition is arbitrary, affecting only the rate of convergence on the right hand
side of the conclusion.
Theorems A and B motivate a class of models for which conditional independence is
generally without loss. The model is defined on a large population of size m (which may
be infinite). On this population, agents make linking decisions according to some jointly
exchangeable network formation game, represented by (6). Agent outcomes in the regression
model are a linear function of the observed covariates and a collection of unknown network
statistics satisfying the hypothesis of Theorem B. The researcher then draws a random sample
of agents of size n, where n is small relative to m. This regression model is then equivalent
to (1), for some choice of social influence function λ, up to a negligibly small error. It also
satisfies the first main identification assumption of Section 2.2 (where network distance is
now defined using the reduced form network types d(w,wi, wj) := ||f(w,wi, ·)−f(w,wj, ·)||2.
I now apply this second interpretation to Example 3.
Example 3 (Research Productivity): Consider a variation on Example 3 from Section
2.1 in which yi, the productivity of researcher i, is explained by the model
yi = xiβ + λ(D
⋆, i) + εi
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in which researcher i belongs to a large population of size m, D⋆ is an m×m binary
adjacency matrix corresponding to a random network on that population (where two
researchers are linked if they interact professionally), and λ(D⋆, i) is the direct effect of the
collection of professional interactions on agent i’s research quality. Suppose D⋆ and
λ(D⋆, i) satisfy the hypothesis of Theorems A and B and the two main identification
assumptions. For example, the professional interactions matrix D⋆ might correspond to an
equilibrium of some complicated economic game and λ(D⋆, i) is the equilibrium quantity of
connections researcher i has with key researchers in the m-sized population. The data then
consists of, for a random sample of size n drawn from this population, the outcomes,
covariates, and professional links connecting these researchers. Following the above
arguments, the joint distribution of the data can be described by the model
yi = xiβ + λ(w,wi) +Op
(
m−1/2
)
+ εi
Dij = 1{ηij ≤ f(w,wi, wj)}1{i 6= j}
in which λ(w,wi) the part of λ(D
⋆, i) that can be explained by f(w,wi, ·) as per Theorem
B and f is the reduced form linking function implied by Theorem A. When m is large
relative to n (that is m/n→∞), the approximation error in the regression model does not
affect the identification and estimation of β or λ(wi), and the methodology of this paper
can be applied.
3 Identification and Large Sample Results
This section formalizes the discussion about identification and estimation from Section 2.2.
Section 3.1 introduces notation, Section 3.2 discusses the identification of β and λ(wi), and
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 characterize the large sample properties of βˆ and λ̂(wi) respectively.
3.1 Terminology and Notation
I define agent i’s network type to be the projection of the link function f onto his or her
social characteristics: fwi(·) := f(wi, ·) : [0, 1] → [0, 1]. In words, it is the collection of
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probabilities that agent i links to agents with each social characteristic in [0, 1]. I consider
network types to be elements of L2([0, 1]), the usual inner product space of square integrable
functions on the unit interval. The previously defined pseudometric d(wi, wj) = ||fwi−fwj ||2
is the usual L2 metric on the space of network types.
I also define two constructions from network theory: (average) agent degrees and (aver-
age) agent-pair codegrees. The degree of agent i is (n− 1)−1∑t6=iDit, the fraction of other
agents linked to agent i. Under (2), that (n − 1)−1∑t6=iDit →a.s. ∫ fwi(τ)dτ follows from
the usual strong law of large numbers. Similarly, for i 6= j the codegree of agent pair (i, j)
is (n − 2)−1∑t6=i,j DitDjt, the fraction of other agents linked to both agent i and agent j.
Again, under (2), (n − 2)−1∑t6=i,j DitDjt →a.s. ∫ fwi(τ)fwj (τ)dτ = 〈fwi, fwj〉L2 . For refer-
ence, I denote this codegree by pˆij and its almost sure limit with p(wi, wj) or pij. I emphasize
that p(wi, wi) refers to the limiting codegree of two distinct agents with social characteristics
equal to wi and not to the limiting degree of agent i. That is, p(wi, wi) :=
∫
fwi(τ)
2dτ =
||fwi||22 6=
∫
fwi(τ)dτ .
The function p also defines a link function in which p(wi, wj) gives the probability that
agents i and j have a link in common, as opposed to f(wi, wj), which gives the probability
that they are directly linked themselves. To distinguish p from f I refer to it as the codegree
link function (associated with f), and the function pwi(·) := p(wi, ·) : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] as agent
i’s codegree type, also taken to be an element of L2([0, 1]). I refer to the pseudometric on
[0, 1] induced by L2-differences in codegree types with δ, so that
δ(u, v) = ||p(u, ·)− p(v, ·)||2 =
(∫ (∫
f(τ, s) (f(u, s)− f(v, s)) ds
)2
dτ
)1/2
for any pair of social characteristics u and v.
I also use two different conditional expectations defined over events on the network types.
Let Zi and Zij be arbitrary random matrices indexed at the agent and agent-pair level
respectively. Then for any positive real x, E[Zij | ||fwi − fwj ||2 = x] refers to
lim
h→0
E[Zij| (wi, wj) ∈ {(u, v) : x ≤ ||fu − fv||2 ≤ x+ h}]
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and for any f in L2 ([0, 1]), E [Zi|fwi = f ] refers to
lim
h→0
E [Zi| wi ∈ {w : ||fw − f ||2 ≤ h}]
Though fwi is a random function, these conditional expectations implicitly refer to the
measure induced by the random variable wi. Conditional expectations with respect to the
codegree types are defined in the same way.
3.2 Identification
This section restates the two main identification conditions from Section 2.2 that are sufficient
for β and λ(wi) to be identified by L
2 differences in the agent network types. That the
network types are identified by the distribution of D follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 in Section
3.3.
Assumption 1: The random sequence {xi, εi, wi}ni=1 is independent and identically
distributed with entries mutually independent of {ηij}ni,j=1, a symmetric random array with
independent and identically distributed entries above the diagonal. The outcomes {yi}ni=1
and D are given by equations (1) and (2) respectively. The variables xi and εi have finite
eigth moments, wi and ηij have standard uniform marginals, and E [εi|xi, wi] = 0.
Assumption 1 restates the model discussed in Section 2.1 and is included as a reference.
Since the marginal distributions of wi and ηij are not seperately identified from f , the
assumption of standard uniform marginals is without loss (see also Bickel and Chen 2009).
Assumption 2: The covariance matrix Γ0 := E
[
(xi − xj)′ (xi − xj) | ||fwi − fwj ||2 = 0
]
is
positive definite.
Assumption 2 is a full rank condition that states that there is independent variation in
each of the regressors not explained by the network types. This assumption may be unreal-
istic when the regressors include agent-specific network statistics as discussed in Example 1
of Section 2.2 (see also Theorem B of Section 2.3).
19
Assumption 3: The social influence function λ satisfies
E
[
(λ(wi)− λ(wj))2 | ||fwi − fwj ||2 = 0
]
= 0.
Assumption 3 states that agents with similar network types have similar social influences,
as motivated in Section 2.2. The parameter β is also identified under the weaker orthogonality
condition E
[
(xi − xj)′ (λ(wi)− λ(wj)) | ||fwi − fwj ||2 = 0
]
= 0.
Theorem 1: Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold. Then β is the unique minimizer of
E
[
((yi − yj)− (xi − xj)b)2 | ||fwi − fwj ||2 = 0
]
over b ∈ Rk and λ(wi) = E [(yi − xiβ) | fwi].
The proof of Theorem 1 follows from standard arguments. Assumptions 1-3 do not rule
out cases where either xi or wi is a deterministic function of the other variable. For example,
if xi = wi, the assumptions may still be satisfied if |{w ∈ [0, 1] : d(w,wi) = 0}| > 0 for
almost every wi. That is, more than one value of social characteristics is associated with
any particular network type. The implication is that it is generally acceptable to include
observed drivers of link formation in the right hand side of the regression model, so long
as these variables cannot be perfectly predicted (in the mean-squared sense) by the agents’
network types.
3.3 Large Sample Properties of βˆ
Section 3.3.1 provides sufficient conditions for βˆ to be consistent for β. Section 3.3.2 provides
sufficient conditions for its limiting distribution to be normal. Accurate inference may require
a bias correction and Section 3.3.3 provides sufficient conditions such that a variation on the
jackknife method of Honore´ and Powell (1997) can be used for this purpose. Section 3.3.4
provides two consistent estimators for the asymptotic variance.
3.3.1 Consistency
I suppose the bandwidth sequence and kernel density function used in (4) satisfy the following
conditions.
Assumption 4: The bandwidth sequence satisfies hn → 0, n1−γh2n →∞ for some γ > 0,
and nrn →∞ for rn = E
[
K
( ||pwi−pwj ||2
hn
)]
as n→∞. K is supported, bounded, and
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differentiable on [0, 1], strictly positive and smooth on [0, 1), and bounded away from 0 on
[0, .5].
The restrictions on the kernel density function are satisfied by a type-II kernel density
function (examples include the Epanechnikov, Biweight, and Bartlett kernels). The first
two restrictions on the bandwidth sequence are also standard. The third, that nrn → ∞,
ensures that the number of matches used to estimate βˆ is increasing with n. If pwi was a
d-dimensional random vector with compact support and a strictly positive density function,
P (||pwi − pwj ||2 ≤ hn) would be on the order of hdn. The number of agent-pairs with similar
codegree types would then be on the order of nhdn, which increases with n if n
1−γhdn → ∞.
Since pwi is infinite dimensional, P (||pwi − pwj ||2 ≤ hn) cannot necessarily be approximated
by a polynomial of hn of known order and so the third condition is required. One can verify it
in practice (in the same sense that one can choose a sequence of bandwidths that satisfies the
first two conditions) by computing the empirical analog of rn and choosing hn such that this
statistic is large relative to 1/n. The framework of this paper also allows for hn to be chosen
in a data-dependent way, for example by cross-validation in the sense of Hall (1984), Stone
(1984) and Hardle and Marron (1985) (see also Nolan and Pollard 1987; 1988), however I
leave the formal study of such an estimator to future work.
If the collection of network differences between agents {||fwi − fwj ||2}i 6=j were observed
and used to construct the matches in βˆ, the arguments for consistency would be similar to
those of Ahn and Powell (1993), though with alterations to accommodate the dimensionality
of fwi. That the estimator is still consistent when ||fwi−fwj ||2 is replaced by δˆij follows from
two arguments. First, {δˆij}i 6=j converges uniformly to {||pwi− pwj ||2}i 6=j over all agent-pairs.
Second, agent-pairs similar with respect to the codegree distance are also similar with respect
to the network distance. These results are the following Lemmas 1 and 2 respectively.
Lemma 1: Suppose Assumptions 1 and 4 hold. Then
max
i 6=j
∣∣∣δˆij − ||pwi − pwj ||2∣∣∣ = op (n−γ/4hn)
in which γ refers to the exponent from Assumption 4.
21
Lemma 1 demonstrates that the collection of
(
n
2
)
empirical codegree distances converges
uniformly to their population analogs at a rate slightly slower than n−1/2. The proof involves
repeated applications of Bernstein’s Inequality and the union bound over the
(
n
2
)
distinct
empirical codegrees that make up {δˆij}i 6=j.
Lemma 2: Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then for every ǫ > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such
that with probability at least 1− ǫ2/4
||pwi − pwj ||2 ≤ δ =⇒ ||fwi − fwj ||2 ≤ ǫ
Lemma 2 is the main justification for the codegree matching procedure. The result is
somewhat unexpected since ||pwi−pwj ||2 ≤ ||fwi−fwj ||2 is almost an immediate consequence
of Jensen’s inequality. That is,
||pwi − pwj ||22 =
∫ (∫
f(t, s) (f(wi, s)− f(wj, s)) ds
)2
dt
≤
∫ (∫
(f(t, s) (f(wi, s)− f(wj, s)))2 ds
)
dt
≤
∫
(f(wi, s)− f(wj, s))2 ds = ||fwi − fwj ||22
where the first inequality is due to Jensen and the second due to the fact that f is bounded
between 0 and 1. Lemma 2 is related to Theorem 13.27 of Lova´sz (2012), the logic of which
demonstrates that ||pwi−pwj ||2 = 0 implies ||fwi−fwj ||2 = 0 when f is continuous. Its proof
is sketched below.
||pwi − pwj ||22 = 0 =⇒
∫ (∫
f(τ, s) (f(wi, s)− f(wj, s)) ds
)2
dτ = 0
=⇒
∫
f(τ, s) (f(wi, s)− f(wj, s)) ds = 0 for every τ
=⇒
∫
f(wi, s) (f(wi, s)− f(wj, s)) ds = 0 and
∫
f(wj, s) (f(wi, s)− f(wj, s)) ds = 0
=⇒
∫
(f(wi, s)− f(wj, s))2 ds = 0 =⇒ ||fwi − fwj ||22 = 0
The intuition is that if agents i and j have identical codegree types, then the difference in
22
their network types (fwi − fwj) must be uncorrelated with each other network type in the
population, as indexed by τ . In particular, the difference is uncorrelated with fwi and fwj ,
the network types of agents i and j. However, this can only be the case if fwi and fwj are
perfectly correlated.
Lova´sz’s theorem demonstrates that agent-pairs with identical codegree types also have
identical network types. However, consistency of βˆ requires a stronger result, that agent-pairs
with similar but not necessarily equivalent codegree types have similar network types. This
is the statement of Lemma 2. Unfortunately the above proof cannot simply be extended
by replacing each occurance of 0 with some function of a small ǫ > 0, because the third
implication relies on
∫
f(τ, s) (f(wi, s)− f(wj, s)) ds = 0 for exactly all τ , which is not
guaranteed by the condition ||pwi − pwj ||22 ≤ ǫ for any ǫ > 0. Still, the proof of Lemma 2
demonstrates that the two notions of distance are similar in enough places that matching
agents with similar codegree types is sufficient to partial out λ(wi) in the regression model
(1) and consistently estimate β under Assumptions 1-4.
Theorem 2: Suppose Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then
(
βˆ − β
)
→p 0 as n→∞.
The proof of Theorem 2 is a direct consequence of Lemmas 1 and 2 and the continuous
mapping theorem.
3.3.2 Asymptotic Normality
I provide two asymptotic normality results. The first concerns the case when the distribution
of fwi has finite support in that P (||fwi − fwj ||2 = 0) = P (||pwi − pwj ||2 = 0) > 0 and there
exists an ǫ > 0 such that P (0 < ||fwi − fwj ||2 < ǫ) = P (0 < ||pwi − pwj ||2 < ǫ) = 0.
This assumption is satisfied by the stochastic blockmodel of Holland, Laskey, and Leinhardt
(1983) (see also Bickel, Choi, Chang, and Zhang 2013).
Theorem 3: Suppose Assumptions 1-4 hold and fwi has finite support. Then as n→∞
V
−1/2
3,n
(
βˆ − β
)
→d N (0, Ik)
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where V3,n = Γ
−1
0 Ω0Γ
−1
0 × s/n, Γ0 is as defined in Assumption 3, Ik is the k × k identity
matrix, and
s = P (||pi − pj ||2 = 0, ||pi − pk||2 = 0)/P (||pi − pj ||2 = 0)2
Ω0 = E [(xi − xj)′(xi − xk)(ui − uj)(ui − uk)| ||pi − pj||2 = 0, ||pi − pk||2 = 0]
with ui = λ(wi) + εi.
Theorem 3 is included in this paper for three reasons. First, it adds to a literature noting
that some of the adverse effects of unobserved heterogeneity might be mitigated when the
support of this variation is finite (see also Hahn and Moon 2010, Bonhomme and Manresa
2015). Second, the assumption of discrete heterogeneity is not uncommon in empirical work
(for instance Schmutte 2014). Third, it provides an easy to interpret condition such that βˆ
converges to β at the
√
n-rate.
The second result concerns the more general case when the support of fwi is not neces-
sarily finite. It requires additional structure on the linking function f and the bandwidth
sequence hn given in Assumptions 5 and 6 respectively.
Assumption 5: There exists an integer K and a partition of [0, 1) into K equally spaced,
adjacent, and non-intersecting intervals ∪Kt=1[x1t , x2t ) such that for any t ∈ {1, ..., K} and
almost every x, y ∈ [x1t , x2t ) and s ∈ [0, 1], |f(x, s)− f(y, s)| ≤ C5|x− y|α, for some C5 ≥ 0
and α > 0.
Assumption 5 supposes that the space of social characteristics can be partitioned into
K segments such that on each partition segment the link function f is almost everywhere
Ho¨lder continuous of order α. The partition allows for discrete jumps of the link function
as to include the discrete heterogeneity models from Theorem 3 as a special case. The
restriction that the partition is uniformly sized is without loss.
Assumption 6: The bandwidth sequence hn = C7 × n−ρ for ρ ∈
(
α
4+8α
, α
2+4α
)
and some
C7 > 0. K is supported, bounded, and differentiable on [0, 1], strictly positive and smooth
on [0, 1), and bounded away from 0 on [0, .5].
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The assumptions on the kernel density function in Assumption 6 are the same as in
Assumption 4. However, the rate of convergence of the bandwidth sequence now depends
on the exponent from Assumption 5. When α = 1 this bandwidth choice is approximately
on the order of magnitude used by Ahn and Powell (1993). In this paper, α is a parameter
to be chosen by the researcher. All of the network formation models cited in Section 2.1
essentially assume α = 1.
The second asymptotic normality proof uses Assumption 5 to strengthen Lemma 2 in
the following way.
Lemma 3: Suppose Assumptions 1 and 5 hold. Then for almost every (wi, wj) pair
||pwi − pwj ||2 ≤ ||fwi − fwj ||2 ≤ 32 C
1
2+4α
6
(||pwi − pwj ||2) α1+2α
so long as ||pwi − pwj ||2 <
√
8C6K
−α, where C5 and α are the constants from Assumption 5.
Theorem 4: Suppose Assumptions 1-3 and 5-6 hold. Then as n→∞
V
−1/2
4,n
(
βˆ − βhn
)
→d N (0, Ik)
where V4,n = Γ
−1
0 ΩnΓ
−1
0 /n, Γ0 is as defined in Assumption 3, rn is as defined in Assumption
4, Ik is the k × k identity matrix, and
βhn = β + (Γ0)
−1E
[
(xi − xj)′(λ(wi)− λ(wj))K
( ||pi − pj ||2
hn
)]
/ (2rn)
Ωn =
4
r2n
E
[
∆i1j1∆
′
i1j2K
(
δ2i1j1
hn
)
K
(
δ2i2j2
hn
)]
+
1
r2nh
2
n
E
[
∆i1j1∆
′
i2j2
K ′
(
δ2i1j1
hn
)
K ′
(
δ2i2j2
hn
)(
Fi1j1t1s11s12 − δ2i1j1
) (
Fi2j2t1s21s22 − δ2i2j2
)]
+
4
r2nh
2
n
E
[
∆i1j1∆
′
i2j2
K ′
(
δ2i1j1
hn
)
K ′
(
δ2i2j2
hn
)(
Fi1j1t1s11s12 − δ2i1j1
) (
Fi2j2t2s11s22 − δ2i2j2
)]
with ∆ij = (xi − xj)′(ui − uj), ui = λ(wi) + εi, δij = δ(wi, wj) = ||pwi − pwj ||2, and
Fijts1s2 = f(wt, ws1)f(wt, ws2) (f(wi, ws1)− f(wj, ws1)) (f(wi, ws2)− f(wj, ws2)).
The statement of Theorem 4 warrants two remarks. First, the variance is not necesarily
on the order of the inverse of the sample size. This is because the variance of the kernel
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r−2n E
[
K
(
||pi−pj ||2
hn
)
K
(
||pi−pk||2
hn
)]
can potentially diverge with n. Even when this variance
diverges, Assumptions 5, 6, and Lemma 3 ensure that the rate of convergence for V4,n is
on the order of at least n−1/2. One can remove this term from the variance (that is, set
K
(
||pi−pj ||2
hn
)
= rn) by choosing a variable bandwidth in which each agent belongs to the
same number of matches, though the strategy also generally inflates the bias of the estimator
relative to βˆ.
The variance is also inflated relative to the infeasible pairwise difference regression using
the unknown codegree distances {δ(wi, wj)}i 6=j, due to the variability of the estimated code-
gree diferences {δˆij}i 6=j around their probability limits. A previous version of this paper gave
conditions such that these components of the variance are asymptotically small. However,
the current statement of Theorem 4 is more general and potentially allows for more accurate
inferences. In Section 3.3.4, I provide two consistent estimators for V4,n.
The second remark is that the asymptotic distribution of βˆ is not centered at β, but
at the pseudo-truth βhn. Though βhn converges to β, the rate of convergence can be slow
depending on the size of α and the conditional expectation function E[(xi − xj)′(λ(wi) −
λ(wj))| ||fwi − fwj ||2 = hn]. This problem is common with matching estimators (see also
Abadie and Imbens 2006; 2012), although the problem is exacerbated here by the relatively
weak relationship between the codegree and network distances given by Lemma 3. Accurate
inferences about β using Theorem 4 will generally require a bias correction.
3.3.3 Bias Correction
I propose a variation on the jackknife technique of Honore´ and Powell (1997), which relies
on the following smoothness condition.
Assumption 7: The pseudo-truth function βh satisfies βh =
∑L
l=1Clh
l/θ +O
(
h(L+1)/θ
)
for
some positive integer L > α/(2θ(1 + 2α)), k-dimensional constants C1, C2, ..., CL, θ > 0,
and h in a fixed open neighborhood to the right of 0.
Assumption 7 assumes that the pseudo-truth βhn can be well approximated by a series
of fractional polynomials. The assumption holds, for example, with θ = 1 if f and λ are
Lipschitz continuous and δ−1(wi, h) = {w ∈ [0, 1] : δ(wi, w) ≤ h} is equal to the union of a
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finite (uniformly over i = 1, ..., n) number of disjoint intervals for almost every wi and all h in
an open interval to the right of 0. In other words, the measure of other social characteristics
that are δ-similar to wi (i.e. have codegree distance ≤ h) does not change drastically near
zero. All of the network formation models cited in Section 2.1 satisfy these conditions.
The method produces a bias-corrected estimator β¯L. For an arbitrary sequence of distinct
positive numbers {c1, c2, ..., cL} with c1 = 1, β¯L is defined to be
β¯L =
L∑
l=1
alβˆclhn (7)
in which βˆclhn refers to the pairwise difference estimator (4) with the choice of bandwidth
cl × hn and the sequence{a1, a2, ...aL} solves
1 1 ... 1
1 c
2/θ
2 ... c
2/θ
L
...
...
. . .
...
1 c
L/θ
2 ... c
L/θ
L
×

a1
a2
...
aL
 =

1
0
...
0

Theorem 5: Suppose Assumptions 1-3 and 5-7 hold. Then as n→∞
V
−1/2
5,n
(
β¯L − β
)→d N (0, Ik)
where V5,n =
∑L
l1=1
∑L
l2=1
al1al2Γ
−1
0 Ωn,l1l2Γ
−1
0 /n, Γ0 is as defined in Assumption 3,
rnl = E
[
K
(
δ2ij
clhn
)]
, Ik is the k × k identity matrix, and
Ωn,l1l2 =
4
rnl1rnl2
E
[
∆i1j1∆
′
i1j2K
(
δ2i1j1
cl1hn
)
K
(
δ2i2j2
cl2hn
)]
+
1
rnl1cl1rnl2cl2h
2
n
E
[
∆i1j1∆
′
i2j2K
′
(
δ2i1j1
cl1hn
)
K ′
(
δ2i2j2
cl2hn
)(
Fi1j1t1s11s12 − δ2i1j1
) (
Fi2j2t1s21s22 − δ2i2j2
)]
+
4
rnl1cl1rnl2cl2h
2
n
E
[
∆i1j1∆
′
i2j2
K ′
(
δ2i1j1
cl1hn
)
K ′
(
δ2i2j2
cl2hn
)(
Fi1j1t1s11s12 − δ2i1j1
) (
Fi2j2t2s11s22 − δ2i2j2
)]
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with ∆ij = (xi − xj)′(ui − uj), ui = λ(wi) + εi, δij = δ(wi, wj) = ||pwi − pwj ||2, and
Fijts1s2 = f(wt, ws1)f(wt, ws2) (f(wi, ws1)− f(wj, ws1)) (f(wi, ws2)− f(wj, ws2)).
3.3.4 Variance Estimation
This section demonstrates that, under the various sets of assumptions provided above, the
asymptotic variances of βˆ− βhn and β¯L− β can be consistently estimated at least two ways.
The first way is direct computation. Let uˆi = yi − xiβˆ,
Γˆh =
(
n
2
)−1 n−1∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
(xi − xj)′ (xi − xj)K
(
δˆ2ij
h
)
and
Ωˆn,h1h2 =
1
n3
n∑
i=1
n∑
j1=1
n∑
j2=1
∆ˆij1∆ˆ
′
ij2K
(
δˆ2ij1
h1
)
K
(
δˆ2ij2
h2
)
+
1
n5h1h2
n∑
i1=1
n∑
i2=1
n∑
j1=1
n∑
j2=1
n∑
t=1
∆ˆi1j1∆ˆi2j2K
′
(
δˆ2i1j1
h1
)
K ′
(
δˆ2i2j2
h2
)(
Fˆi1j1t − δˆ2i1j1
)(
Fˆi2j2t − δˆ2i2j2
)
+
4
n5h1h2
n∑
i1=1
n∑
i2=1
n∑
j1=1
n∑
j2=1
n∑
t=1
∆ˆi1j1∆ˆi2j2K
′
(
δˆ2i1j1
h1
)
K ′
(
δˆ2i2j2
h2
)(
Fˆ ′i1j1t − δˆ2i1j1
)(
Fˆ ′i2j2t − δˆ2i2j2
)
where hl = clhn, ∆ˆij = (xi−xj)′(uˆi−uˆj), Fˆijt = 1n2
∑n
s1=1
∑n
s2=1
Dts1Dts2 (Dis1 −Djs1) (Dis2 −Djs2),
and Fˆ ′ijs1 =
1
n2
∑n
t=1
∑n
s2=1
Dts1Dts2 (Dis1 −Djs1) (Dis2 −Djs2)
Theorem 6: Suppose Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then
(
Γˆ−1hn Ωˆn,hn,hnΓˆ
−1
h − nV4,n
)
→p 0 and(∑L
l1=1
∑L
l2=1
al1al2Γˆ
−1
cl1hn
Ωˆn,cl1hn,cl2hnΓˆ
−1
cl2hn
− nV5,n
)
→p 0 as n→∞.
A corollary to Theorem 6 is that Γˆ−1hn Ωˆhn,hnΓˆ
−1
h also consistently estimates nV3,n under
the hypothesis of Theorem 3, although one can omit the last two summands when computing
Ωˆn,hnhn.
Another way to estimate the asymptotic variances uses the bootstrap. Let {{itr}nt=1}Rr=1
denote a sequence of R independent samples of agents of size n drawn from {1, ..., n} with
replacement. With this notation, itr denotes the original index of the agent in the tth index
of the rth sample. Let (ytr, xtr, wtr) denote the outcome, covariates, and social characteristics
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of agent itr and Dr = {Dstr}s 6=t be the n× n adjacency matrix induced by the agents in the
rth sample in which Dstr = Disritr . Let {βˆr}Rr=1 and {β¯Lr}Rr=1 denote the estimators from
(4) and (7) constructed using {ytr, xtr}nt=1 and Dr.
Theorem 7: Suppose Assumptions 1-3 and 5-6 hold. Then
1
R
∑R
r=1
(
βˆr − βˆ
)(
βˆr − βˆ
)′
→p V4,n and 1R
∑R
r=1
(
β¯Lr − β¯L
) (
β¯Lr − β¯L
)′ →p V5,n as
n,R→∞.
Consistency of the bootstrap variance estimators follows from the fact that under As-
sumptions 1-3 and 5-6, βˆ and β¯L (and thus βˆr and β¯Lr) are asymptotically averages of
functions of the iid sequence {yi, xi, wi}ni=1. Theorem 7 is then a consequence of Theorem
2.2 of Bickel and Freedman (1981).
3.4 Large Sample Properties of λ̂(wi)
This section provides two results about the estimators for the social influence term λ(wi):
consistency and asymptotic normality. The two results mirror those Section 3.3.1 and Section
3.3.2 respectively and so only a limited discussion is provided here.
The first result is that Assumptions 1-4 are sufficient for {λ̂(wi)}ni=1, the collection of
estimators for the sampled agents to be consistent for their population analogs in the mean-
squared sense. This result is stated as Theorem 8.
Theorem 8: Suppose Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then E
[(
λ̂(wi)− λ(wi)
)2]
→p 0 as n→∞,
where the expectation is taken with respect to wi.
Theorem 8 follows almost immediately from Theorem 2 and Lemmas 1 and 2. It can
be strengthened to convergence in the sup norm sense under an analogous strengthening of
Assumption 3.
The second result is that, under an additional restriction on the choice of bandwidth
sequence, these conditions are also sufficient for {λ(wi)}i∈S, the collection of estimators
corresponding to a finite (i.e. fixed in n) set of agents S ⊂ {1, ..., n}, to be asymptotically
normal. This additional restriction is given by Assumption 8 and the result is stated as the
following Theorem 9.
Assumption 8: The bandwidth sequence hn satisfies nrn,i →∞ and bn,in/rn,i → 0 where
rn,i = E
[
K
( ||pwi−pwj ||2
hn
)
|wi
]
, r′n,i = E
[
λ(wj)K
( ||pwi−pwj ||2
hn
)
|wi
]
, and
bn,i =
(
λ(wi)rn,i − r′n,i
)2
for all i ∈ S.
The first condition nrn,i → ∞ states that the number of matches to agent i grows
with the sample size, and is analogous to the third bandwidth condition in Assumption 4.
The second condition bn,in/rn,i → 0 is an undersmoothing condition that assumes that the
bandwidth is chosen to be small enough so that the estimators are asymptotically unbiased.
These conditions can be approximated in practice using the empirical analogs of rn,i, r
′
n,i,
and λ(wi) (see also the discussion of Assumption 4 in Section 3.3.1). The setting of this
paper also potentially allows for hn to be chosen using a data dependent method such as
cross-validation, although I leave the formal study of such an estimator to future work.
Theorem 9: Suppose Assumptions 1-4 and 8 hold. Let λˆS = {λ̂(wi)}i∈S for some finite
collection of agents S. Then as n→∞
V
−1/2
8,n
(
λˆS − λS
)
→d N
(
0, I|S|
)
where λS = {λ(wi)}i∈S, I|S| is the |S| × |S| identity matrix, V8,n = diag({V8,n,i}i∈S), and
V8,n,i =
n∑
t=1
((
utK
(
δit
hn
)
− r′n,i
)
− r
′
n,i
rn,i
(
K
(
δit
hn
)
− rn,i
))2
/(nr2n,i)
One can estimate V8,n,i directly as in the first part of Section 3.3.4 using the empir-
ical analogs of ut, δit, rn,i and r
′
n,i, along the lines of Theorem 6, or by using the boot-
strap, along the lines of Theorem 7. Consistency of the resulting variance estimators
follows from identical arguments, and so is not demonstrated here. One can potentially
extend the conclusion of Theorem 9 using arguments from Horowitz and Lee (2016) or
Chernozhukov, Chetverikov, and Kato (2017), although such an extension is not considered
in this paper.
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4 Simulations
This section presents simulation evidence for three types of network formation models: a
stochastic blockmodel, a beta model, and a homophily model. For each of R simulations, I
draw a random sample of n observations {ξi, εi, ωi}ni=1 from a trivariate normal distribution
with mean 0 and covariance given by the identity matrix and a random symmetric matrix
{ηij}ni,j=1 with independent and identically distributed upper diagonal entries with standard
uniform marginals. For each of the following link functions f , the adjacency matrix D is
formed by D = 1{ηij ≤ f (Φ(ωi),Φ(ωj))} where Φ is the cumulative distribution function
for the standard univariate normal distribution.
The first design draws D from a stochastic blockmodel where
f1(u, v) =

1/3 if u ≤ 1/3 and v > 1/3
1/3 if 1/3 < u ≤ 2/3 and v ≤ 2/3
1/3 if u > 2/3 and (v > 2/3 or v ≤ 1/3)
0 otherwise
The linking function f1 generates network types with finite support as in the hypothesis of
Theorem 3. For this model, I take λ(ωi) = ⌈3Φ(ωi)⌉, xi = ξi+λ(ωi), and yi = βxi+γλ(ωi)+εi.
The second and third designs draw D from the beta model and homophily model where
f2(u, v) =
exp(u+ v)
1 + exp(u+ v)
and f3(u, v) = 1− (u− v)2
For these models, λ(ωi) = ωi, xi = ξi + λ(ωi) and yi = βxi + γλ(ωi) + εi.
Let x and y to denote the stacked n-dimensional vector of observations {xi}ni=1 and
{yi}ni=1, and Z1 for the (n× 2) matrix {xi, λ(ωi)}ni=1. I use ci to denote a vector of network
statistics for agent i based on D containing agent degree n−1
∑n
j=1Dij, eigenvector cen-
trality,1 and average peer covariates
∑n
j=1Dijxj/
∑n
j=1Dij. Z2 denotes the stacked vector
{xi, ci}ni=1.
For each design, I evaluate the performance of six estimators. The benchmark is βˆ1 =
1Agent i’s eigenvector centrality statistics refers to the ith entry of the eigenvector of D associated with
the largest eigenvalue.
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(Z ′1Z1)
−1(Z ′1y), the infeasible OLS regression of y on x and λ(ωi). βˆ2 = (x
′x)−1(x′y) is
the na¨ıve OLS regression of y on x. βˆ3 = (Z
′
2Z2)
−1(Z ′2y) is the OLS regression of y on x
and the vector of network controls c. βˆ4 is the proposed pairwise difference estimator given
in (4) without bias correction, βˆ5 is the bias corrected estimator, and βˆ6 is the pairwise
difference estimator with an adaptive bandwidth but without bias correction (specifically,
the bandwidth depends on i and is chosen such that each agent is matched to the same
number of other agents). The pairwise difference estimators all use the Epanechnikov kernel
K(u) = 3(1− u2)1{u2 < 1}/4. Estimators βˆ4 and βˆ5 use the bandwidth sequence n−1/9/10
and the estimator βˆ6 uses the bandwidth sequence n
−1/9/5. Since n1/9 is roughly equal to 2
for the sample sizes considered in this section, the results are close to a constant bandwidth
choice of hn = .05 and .1 respectively.
Tables 1-3 demonstrates the results for R = 1000, β = γ = 1 and for each n in
{50, 100, 200, 500, 800}. For each model, estimator and sample size, the first row gives the
mean, the second gives the mean absolute error of the simulated estimators around β, the
third gives the mean absolute error divided by that of βˆ1, and the fourth gives the proportion
of the simulation draws that fall outside of a 0.95 confidence interval based on the asymptotic
distributions derived in the previous section.
Table 1 contains results for the stochastic blockmodel. The na¨ıve estimator βˆ2 has a
large and stable positive bias that is not reduced as n is increased. The OLS estimator with
network controls βˆ3 is not asymptotically well defined in this example because the network
statistics converge to constants. The results in Table 1 instead demonstrate a common “fix”
in the literature, which is to instead calculate (Z ′2Z2)
+(Z ′2y) where + refers to the Moore-
Penrose pseudo-inverse. The results for this estimator indicate that adding network controls
mitigates some of the bias in β1 (due to sampling variation in the number of agents in each
block), however the estimator is otherwise poorly behaved. Notice this bias returns when
the block sizes stabilize (in particular when n = 800).
The results for the pairwise difference estimators illustrate the content of Theorem 3,
that when the unobserved heterogeneity is discrete, the proposed estimator identifies pairs of
agents of the same type with high probability. As a result, the pairwise difference estimators
βˆ4 and βˆ6 behave similarly to the infeasible βˆ2. For the stochastic blockmodel, Assumption 9
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Table 1: Simulation Results, Stochastic Blockmodel
Infeasible Na¨ıve OLS with Pairwise Bias Adaptive
OLS OLS Controls Difference Corrected Bandwidth
n βˆ1 βˆ2 βˆ3 βˆ4 βˆ5 βˆ6
50
bias 0.004 0.829 0.268 0.060 0.022 0.106
MAE 0.116 0.829 0.274 0.224 0.240 0.150
rMAE 1.000 7.147 2.362 1.931 2.069 1.293
size 0.057 0.063 0.072 0.115 0.123 0.067
100
bias 0.003 0.829 0.226 0.021 -0.022 0.019
MAE 0.083 0.829 0.229 0.089 0.094 0.084
rMAE 1.000 9.988 2.759 1.072 1.133 1.012
size 0.064 0.053 0.108 0.053 0.058 0.056
200
bias 0.001 0.823 0.180 0.004 -0.040 0.002
MAE 0.056 0.823 0.183 0.058 0.069 0.058
rMAE 1.000 14.696 3.268 1.036 1.232 1.036
size 0.049 0.044 0.215 0.045 0.064 0.058
500
bias 0.000 0.824 0.172 0.006 0.038 0.001
MAE 0.035 0.824 0.174 0.035 0.048 0.035
rMAE 1.000 23.543 4.971 1.000 1.371 1.000
size 0.033 0.061 0.777 0.037 0.047 0.044
800
bias 0.001 0.823 0.314 0.008 -0.036 0.000
MAE 0.029 0.823 0.314 0.029 0.043 0.029
rMAE 1.000 28.379 10.828 1.000 1.483 1.000
size 0.057 0.038 0.127 0.054 0.068 0.062
Table 1: This table contains simulation results for 1000 replications and a sample size of n =
50, 100, 200, 500, 800. Bias gives the mean estimator minus 1. MAE gives the mean absolute error of the
estimator around 1. rMAE gives the mean absolute error relative to the benchmark βˆ1. Size gives the
proportion of draws that fall outside the asymptotic 0.95 confidence interval.
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is not valid, and so the jackknife bias correction actually inflates both the bias and variance of
βˆ4. Looking at the relative mean absolute error for this estimator, it is clear that the relative
performance of the error is deteriorating as n increases (though the bias and variance of this
estimator is still on the order of 1/
√
n).
Table 2 contains results for the beta model. Relative to the stochastic blockmodel, all
of the estimators for the beta model (except infeasible OLS) have large biases. This is
because the link function f2 is very flat, so that the variation in linking probabilities that
identifies the network positions is relatively small (see also Section 5 of Johnsson and Moon
2015). One can show that the social characteristics are identified by the distribution of D
(they are consistently estimated by the order statistics of the degree distribution), but the
bound on the deviation of the social characteristics given by the network metric is large:
|u− v| ≤ 20× d(u, v).
Still, the proposed pairwise difference estimator offers a substantial improvement in per-
formence relative to both the na¨ıve estimator βˆ2 and the estimator with network controls βˆ3.
For example, when n = 100, βˆ5 has approximately half the bias and mean absolute error of
βˆ1 while βˆ3 offers a reduction of less than ten percent. When n = 800 the reduction in bias
is over three times as large (75% relative to 23%).
Table 3 contains results for the homophily model. As in the case of the beta model, one
can show that the social characteristics are also identified in the homophily model. Unlike
the beta model, there is a relatively large amount of information about the network positions
in the linking probabilities so that all of the estimators in Table 3 are much better behaved.
In fact, for this model |u− v| ≤ d(u, v).
In this example, the OLS estimator with network controls actually performs comparably
to the uncorrected pairwise difference estimator βˆ4. This is because the peer characteristics
variable
∑n
j=1Dijxj/
∑n
j=1Dij is a good approximation of wi when n is large. However,
the bias corrected estimator βˆ5 outperforms both estimators over all of the sample sizes
considered.
34
Table 2: Simulation Results, Beta Model
Infeasible Na¨ıve OLS with Pairwise Bias Adaptive
OLS OLS Controls Difference Corrected Bandwidth
n βˆ1 βˆ2 βˆ3 βˆ4 βˆ5 βˆ6
50
bias 0.000 0.496 0.462 0.379 0.335 0.365
MAE 0.119 0.496 0.463 0.381 0.341 0.366
rMAE 1.000 4.168 3.891 3.202 2.866 3.076
size 0.064 0.063 0.075 0.049 0.066 0.070
100
bias 0.006 0.501 0.462 0.336 0.269 0.298
MAE 0.082 0.501 0.462 0.336 0.270 0.299
rMAE 1.000 6.110 5.634 4.098 3.293 3.646
size 0.055 0.053 0.055 0.039 0.062 0.081
200
bias 0.002 0.501 0.444 0.290 0.200 0.231
MAE 0.058 0.501 0.444 0.290 0.200 0.231
rMAE 1.000 8.638 7.655 5.000 3.448 3.983
size 0.050 0.041 0.036 0.033 0.054 0.070
500
bias 0.003 0.499 0.403 0.246 0.136 0.151
MAE 0.036 0.499 0.403 0.246 0.136 0.151
rMAE 1.000 13.861 11.194 6.833 3.778 4.194
size 0.049 0.042 0.054 0.022 0.033 0.076
800
bias 0.000 0.500 0.385 0.237 0.122 0.122
MAE 0.028 0.500 0.385 0.237 0.122 0.122
rMAE 1.000 17.857 13.750 8.464 4.357 4.357
size 0.050 0.054 0.078 0.037 0.050 0.062
Table 2: This table contains simulation results for 1000 replications and a sample size of n =
50, 100, 200, 500, 800. Bias gives the mean estiamtor minus 1. MAE gives the mean absolute error of the
estimator around 1. rMAE gives the mean absolute error relative to the benchmark βˆ1. Size gives the
proportion of draws that fall outside the asymptotic 0.95 confidence interval.
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Table 3: Simulation Results, Homophily Model
Infeasible Na¨ıve OLS with Pairwise Bias Adaptive
OLS OLS Controls Difference Corrected Bandwidth
n βˆ1 βˆ2 βˆ3 βˆ4 βˆ5 βˆ6
50
bias 0.007 0.505 0.269 0.128 0.087 0.140
MAE 0.120 0.505 0.274 0.108 0.121 0.211
rMAE 1.000 4.208 2.283 0.900 1.008 1.758
size 0.068 0.051 0.063 0.062 0.068 0.132
100
bias 0.005 0.502 0.162 0.100 0.057 0.089
MAE 0.081 0.502 0.167 0.124 0.108 0.116
rMAE 1.000 6.198 2.062 1.531 1.333 1.432
size 0.049 0.059 0.061 0.053 0.066 0.083
200
bias 0.001 0.503 0.095 0.085 0.039 0.055
MAE 0.057 0.503 0.100 0.097 0.075 0.077
rMAE 1.000 8.825 1.754 1.702 1.316 1.351
size 0.054 0.059 0.054 0.050 0.057 0.069
500
bias 0.000 0.501 0.047 0.074 0.028 0.035
MAE 0.035 0.501 0.053 0.077 0.048 0.046
rMAE 1.000 14.314 1.514 2.200 1.371 1.314
size 0.043 0.059 0.039 0.045 0.058 0.051
800
bias 0.000 0.501 0.034 0.070 0.023 0.030
MAE 0.028 0.501 0.086 0.072 0.039 0.038
rMAE 1.000 17.893 3.071 2.571 1.392 1.357
size 0.039 0.040 0.041 0.038 0.050 0.047
Table 3: This table contains simulation results for 1000 replications and a sample size of n =
50, 100, 200, 500, 800. Bias gives the mean estiamtor minus 1. MAE gives the mean absolute error of the
estimator around 1. rMAE gives the mean absolute error relative to the benchmark βˆ1. Size gives the
proportion of draws that fall outside the asymptotic 0.95 confidence interval.
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5 Directions for Future Work
I highlight two directions for future work. The first direction is to relax the partially linear
structure of the regression model (1). With a little work, I suspect that the main ideas
of this paper also apply to nonlinear regression models in which other applications of the
pairwise differencing logic in (4) has been effective (for instance, Honore´ and Powell 1994;
1997, Hong and Shum 2010, Aradillas-Lopez 2012), so long as the unobserved heterogeneity
in the regression model is continuous with respect to network distance, in the sense of
Assumption 2. For instance, one might consider the partially linear Logit model yi = 1{xβ+
λ(wi)−εi > 0} where the errors {εi}ni=1 are iid logistically distributed random variables and,
along the lines of Honore´ and Powell (1997), estimate β by maximizing
−
∑
i 6=j
K
(
δˆij
hn
)
(yi ln(1 + exp((xj − xi)b) + yj ln(1 + exp((xi − xj)b))
over b ∈ Rk. This model could be used to study binary outcomes as in the program partici-
pation application in Example 2 of Section 2.1.
One might also consider the nonparametric regression model yi = m(xi, wi) + εi, and
estimate features of m along the lines of Theorems 8 and 9, by local averaging in the sense of
Nadaraya (1965) and Watson (1964), using the empirical codegree distance. Nonparametric
predictions of yi may be useful to the literature on contagion, in which one object of interest
is the conditional probability that agent i becomes infected conditional on that agent’s
observed characteristics and social or economic connections to other agents.
The second direction for future work is to extend the network formation model (2) as to
allow for more general network structures. With a little work, I suspect that the main ideas
of this paper also apply to directed and weighted networks, where E [Dij |wi, wj] = f(wi, wj)
so long as f is square integrable. If linking behavior is still conditionally independent, the
main arguments in Section 2.3 are still valid and analogs of Lemmas 1 and 2 still hold.
One can also incorporate exogenous covariates into the right-hand side of the network
formation model, by redefining the agent network types. That is, one can consider the
model Dij = 1{ηij ≤ f(wi, wj, zij)}, where {zij}i 6=j is observed data. If zij has finite sup-
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port, then one can assign each agent a network type for each element of that support, i.e.
{f(wi, ·, z)}z∈supp(zij). Extending this logic to the case where zij has continuous support is,
to my knowledge, nontrivial, and a topic I plan to explore in more detail in future work. As
mentioned in the discussion of Example 1 in Section 2.2, one potential use of exogenous link
covariates is to identify network peer effects in the presence of unobserved social influence.
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A Proofs of Lemmas and Theorems
This section contains proofs of the various Lemmas and Theorems from Section 3. Auxiliary
lemmas not formally stated in the paper are labelled Lemma A1, Lemma A2, et cetera.
A.1 Lemmas and Theorems from Section 2.3
Theorem B: Suppose λ(D, i) satisfies the symmetry and bounded deivations assumptions,
and that (6) holds. Then
|λ(D, i)− λ(D, j)| ≤ C||f(w,wi, ·)− f(w,wj, ·)||2 +Op
(
m−1/2
)
for some C depending on f and w.
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Proof of Theorem B First write
λ(D, i)− λ(D, j) = (λ(D, i)− λ(D, i− j)) + (λ(D, i− j)− λ(D, j − i))
+ (λ(D, j − i)− λ(D, j))
where λ(D, i− j) = λ(D′′, i) for D′′st = Dst1{s, t 6= j}. Intuitively, λ(D, i− j) is the
network statistic based on network D and agent i with all of agent j’s links removed.
The bounded deviations condition implies
(λ(D, i)− λ(D, i− j)) + (λ(D, j − i)− λ(D, j)) = Op
(
m−1
)
since agent j has at most one connection to agent i and m− 2 connections to other agents.
It remains to be shown that
(λ(D, i− j)− λ(D, j − i)) ≤ C||fwi − fwj ||2 +Op
(
m−1/2
)
where fwi is shorthand for the network type f(w,wi, ·).
To see this, write
(λ(D, i− j)− λ(D, j − i)) =
∑
τ 6=i,j
(λ(D, i− j, τ, 1)− λ(D, i− j, τ, 0)) (Diτ −Djτ)
=
∑
τ 6=i,j
(λ(D, i− j, τ, 1)− λ(D, i− j, τ, 0)) [(Diτ − fiτ ) + (fjτ −Djτ) + (fiτ − fjτ )]
where fiτ = f(w,wi, wτ ), λ(D, i− j, τ, p) = λ(D′′′(p), i) and
D′′′st(p) = Dst1{s, t 6= i, j}+Dit1{i = s and t > τ}
+Djt1{i = s and t < τ} + p1{i = s and t = τ}
Intuitively, λ(D, i− j, τ, p) is the network statistic on network D for agent i with the link
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between i and τ replaced with p and if t < τ the link between i and t is replaced with Djt.
I consider the three summands in the square brackets of the second line seperately. The
second summand
∑
τ 6=i,j
(λ(D, i− j, τ, 1)− λ(D, i− j, τ, 0)) (fjτ −Djτ)
is a martingale with respect to the filtration
Fτ = σ (w, {Dst : s, t 6= j or s = j, t ≤ τ} ∪ {wt : t ∈ N}), and so the summand is
Op
(
m−1/2
)
by Azuma’s inequality since
|(λ(D, i− j, τ, 1)− λ(D, i− j, τ, 0)) (fjτ −Djτ )| = Op (m−1) by the bounded deviations
condition.
The first summand can be rewritten as
∑
σ 6=i′,j′
(λ(D, j′ − i′, τ ′, 0)− λ(D, j′ − i′, τ ′, 1)) (Di′τ ′ − fi′τ ′)
where τ ′ = m+ 1− τ , i′ = m+ 1− i, and j′ = m+ 1− j. This sum is also a martingale
with respect to the filtration Fτ ′ = σ (w, {Dst : s, t 6= i′ or s = i′, t ≤ τ ′} ∪ {wt : t ∈ N}) and
so is also Op
(
m−1/2
)
following Azuma’s inequality.
Altogether,
λ(D, i)− λ(D, j) =
∑
τ 6=i,j
(λ(D, i− j, τ, 1)− λ(D, i− j, τ, 0)) (fiτ − fjτ ) +Op
(
m−1/2
)
≤
√∑
τ 6=i,j
(λ(D, i− j, τ, 1)− λ(D, i− j, τ, 0))2 ×
∑
τ 6=i,j
(fiτ − fjτ)2 +Op
(
m−1/2
)
≤ C ×
√
1
m
∑
τ 6=i,j
(fiτ − fjτ)2 +Op
(
m−1/2
)
where C = 2× plimm→∞
√
m
∑
τ 6=i,j (λ(D, i− j, τ, 1)− λ(D, i− j, τ, 0))2 <∞, the first
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inequality due to Cauchy-Schwarz, and the second due to the bounded deviations
condition. The final term is equal to C||fwi − fwj ||2 +Op
(
m−1/2
)
by Markov’s inequality,
which completes the proof. 
A.2 Lemmas and Theorems in Section 3.2
Theorem 1: Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold. Then β is the unique minimizer of
E
[
((yi − yj)− (xi − xj)b)2 | ||fwi − fwj ||2 = 0
]
over b ∈ Rk and λ(wi) = E [(yi − xiβ) | fwi].
Proof of Theorem 1: Let dij shorthand ||fwi − fwj ||2 and ui = yi − xiβ. The second
claim follows from E [ε|xi, wi] = 0 and Assumption 3 since
E [ui|fwi] = E [λ(wi)|fwi] + E [E [εi|xi, wi] |fwi] = λ(wi)
The first claim follows from
E
[
((yi − yj)− (xi − xj)b)2 |dij = 0
]
= E
[
((xi − xj)(β − b) + (ui − uj))2 |dij = 0
]
= (β − b)′E[(xi − xj)′(xi − xj)|dij = 0](β − b) + E[(ui − uj)2|dij = 0]
− 2(β − b)′E[(xi − xj)′(ui − uj)|dij = 0]
in which first summand is uniquely minimized at b = β by Assumption 2, the second
summand does not depend on b, and the third summand is equal to 0 by Assumption 3
(since E [ε|xi, wi] = 0).
A.3 Lemmas and Theorems in Section 3.3.1
Lemma 1: Suppose Assumptions 1 and 4 hold. Then
max
(i 6=j)
∣∣∣δˆ2ij − ||pwi − pwj ||22∣∣∣ = op (n−γ/4hn)
Proof of Lemma 1: Let h′n = n
−γ/4hn, pwiwj =
∫
fwi(τ)fwj (τ)dτ ,
pˆwiwj = (n− 2)−1
∑
t6=i,j DitDjt, ||pˆwi − pwi||22,n,j = (n− 2)−1
∑
s 6=i,j (pˆwiws − pwiws)2, and
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||pwi − pwj ||22,n = (n− 2)−1
∑
s 6=i,j (pwiws − pwiws)2. Then for any fixed ǫ > 0,
P
(
max
i 6=j
h′−1n
∣∣∣δˆ2ij − ||pwi − pwj ||22∣∣∣ > ǫ)
= P
(
max
i 6=j
h′−1n
∣∣∣δˆ2ij − ||pwi − pwj ||22,n + ||pwi − pwj ||22,n − ||pwi − pwj ||22∣∣∣ > ǫ)
≤ P
(
max
i 6=j
h′−1n
∣∣∣δˆ2ij − ||pwi − pwj ||22,n∣∣∣ > ǫ/2)
+ P
(
max
i 6=j
h′−1n
∣∣||pwi − pwj ||22,n − ||pwi − pwj ||22∣∣ > ǫ/2)
= P
(
max
i 6=j
h′−1n
∣∣∣δˆij − ||pwi − pwj ||22,n∣∣∣ > ǫ/2)
≤ P
(
max
i 6=j
h′−1n
∣∣∣∣∣(n− 2)−1 ∑
s 6=i,j
(
(pˆwiws − pˆwjws)− (pwiws − pwjws)
)∣∣∣∣∣ > ǫ/8
)
≤ 2P
(
max
i 6=j
h′−1n (n− 2)−1
∑
s 6=i,j
|pˆwiws − pwiws| > ǫ/16
)
= o(1)
in which P
(
maxi 6=j h′−1n
∣∣||pwi − pwj ||22,n − ||pwi − pwj ||22∣∣ > ǫ/2) = o(1) in the second
equality and P
(
maxi 6=j h′−1n (n− 2)−1
∑
s 6=i,j |pˆwiws − pwiws| > ǫ/16
)
= o(1) in the final
equality are demonstrated below, the first inequality is due to the triangle inequality, the
second inequality is due to the fact that |pwi + pˆwi| ≤ 2 for every wi ∈ [0, 1], and the final
inequality is due to the triangle and Jensen’s inequality.
The second result, that P
(
maxi 6=j h′−1n (n− 2)−1
∑
s 6=i,j |pˆwiws − pwiws | > ǫ/16
)
= o(1)
follows from the fact that maxi 6=j h′−1n |pˆwiwj − pwiwj | →p 0 by Bernstein’s inequality and the
union bound. Specifically, the former implies that for any ǫ > 0
P
(
h′−1n |pˆwiwj − pwiwj | > ǫ
)
= P
(
h′−1n
∣∣∣∣∣(n− 2)−1 ∑
t6=i,j
(
DitDjt − pwiwj
)∣∣∣∣∣ > ǫ
)
≤ 2 exp
(−(n− 2)(h′nǫ)2
2 + 2h′nǫ/3
)
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and the latter gives
P
(
max
i 6=j
h′−1n |pˆwiwj − pwiwj | > ǫ
)
≤ 2n(n− 1) exp
(−(n− 2)(h′nǫ)2
2 + 2h′nǫ/3
)
which is o(1) since n1−γh′2n →∞ for some γ > 0.
The first result, that P
(
maxi 6=j h′−1n
∣∣||pwi − pwj ||22,n − ||pwi − pwj ||22∣∣ > ǫ/2) = o(1), also
follows from Bernstein’s inequality since
P
(
h′−1n
∣∣||pwi − pwj ||22,n − ||pwi − pwj ||22∣∣ > ǫ)
= P
(
h′−1n
∣∣∣∣∣(n− 2)−1 ∑
s 6=i,j
(
pwiws − pwjws
)2 − ∫ (pwi(s)− pwj(s))2 ds
∣∣∣∣∣ > ǫ
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−(n− 2)h′nǫ
2 + 2
√
h′nǫ/3
)
which is o(1) since nh′n →∞. This completes the proof. 
Lemma 2: Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then for every ǫ > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such
that with probability at least 1− ǫ2/4
||pwi − pwj ||2 ≤ δ =⇒ ||fwi − fwj ||2 ≤ ǫ
Proof of Lemma 2: I first note that since f is Lebesgue measurable, Lusin’s theorem
(Dudley (2002), Theorem 7.5.2) implies that it is almost everywhere equivalent to a
uniformly continuous function. That is, for any η′ > 0, there exists a closed subset A of
[0, 1]2 with measure at least 1− η′ such that f is uniformly continuous when restricted to A.
It follows that for any η > 0 there must also exist, a closed subset B of [0, 1] with measure
of at least 1− η such that for any b ∈ B, there exists another closed subset C(b) of [0, 1]
with measure of at least 1− η, such that for any c ∈ C(b), f is uniformly continuous when
restricted to the set A′ = {(b, c) ∈ [0, 1]2 : b ∈ B, c ∈ C(b)}.
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Second, I show that for all ǫ′ > 0 there exists a δ(ǫ′, η) > 0 such that ||pwi − pwj ||2 ≤ δ(ǫ′, η)
implies | ∫ fwi(s)(fwi(s)− fwj (s))ds| < ǫ′ with probability at least 1− ǫ′/4, so long as
η ≤ ǫ′/16 .
Specifically, I prove the contrapositive. Suppose | ∫ fwi(s)(fwi(s)− fwj(s))ds| ≥ ǫ′. Then by
the negative triangle inequality | ∫ fτ (s)(fwi(s)− fwj(s))ds| > ǫ′/2 for any τ ∈ [0, 1] chosen
such that | ∫ (fτ (s)− fwi(s))(fwi(s)− fwj(s))ds| < ǫ′/4. Since ||fwi − fwj ||2 ≤ 1 for every
(wi, wj) pair, it follows by Cauchy-Schwartz that ||fwi − fτ ||2 ≤ ǫ′/4 implies
| ∫ fτ (s)(fwi(s)− fwj(s))ds| > ǫ′/2.
Since f is uniformly continuous when restricted to A′, there exists a universal ω(ǫ′, η) > 0
such that |τ − wi| < ω(ǫ′, η) implies that ||fτ − fwi||2 < ǫ′/8 + 2η so long as wi, τ ∈ B.
Taking η ≤ ǫ′/16 gives |τ − wi| < ω(ǫ′, η) implies that ||fτ − fwi||2 < ǫ′/4 so long as
wi, τ ∈ B. It follows that choosing τ such that |τ − wi| < ω(ǫ′, η) implies
| ∫ fτ (s)(fwi(s)− fwj(s))ds| > ǫ′/2
It is without loss to further restrict ω(ǫ′, η) < ǫ′/16. Since wi is uniformly distributed on
[0, 1], the probability that wi is in the ǫ
′/16 interior of B (that is, the interval
(wi − ǫ′/16, wi + ǫ′16) is contained in B) is greater than 1− η − 2ω(ǫ′, η) ≥ 1− ǫ′/4. This
implies that | ∫ fτ (s)(fwi(s)− fwj(s))ds| > ǫ′/2 on a subset of [0, 1] of measure at least
2ω(ǫ′, η) with probability at least 1− ǫ′/4.
Thus | ∫ fwi(s)(fwi(s)− fwj (s))ds| ≥ ǫ′ implies∫ (∫
fτ (s)(fwi(s)− fwj (s))ds
)2
dτ > (ǫ′/2)2 × 2ω(ǫ′, η) with probability at least 1− ǫ′/4.
Since the left hand side is just ||pi − pj ||22, it follows that ||pi − pj ||2 > (ǫ′/2)× (2ω(ǫ′, η))1/2
with probability at least 1− ǫ′/4, which proves this second part. Taking the contrapositive
yields ||pi − pj ||2 ≤ δ(ǫ′, η) implies that |
∫
fwi(s)(fwi(s)− fwj(s))ds| < ǫ′ with probability
at least 1− ǫ′/4, where δ(ǫ′, η) = (ǫ′/2)× (2ω(ǫ′, η))1/2.
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To finish the proof, note that
∣∣∫ fwi(s)(fwi(s)− fwj (s))ds∣∣ < ǫ′ and∣∣∫ fwj (s)(fwi(s)− fwj (s))ds∣∣ < ǫ′ also imply that∣∣∫ (fwi(s)− fwj (s))(fwi(s)− fwj (s))ds∣∣ < 2ǫ′ by the triangle inequality, so that
||pi − pj ||2 ≤ (ǫ′/2)× (2ω(ǫ′, η))1/2 implies ||fwi − fwj ||2 <
√
2ǫ′ with probability at least
1− ǫ′/2. Thus ||pi − pj||2 ≤ δ(ǫ, η) implies ||fwi − fwj ||2 < ǫ with probability at least
> 1− ǫ2/4 as claimed, where δ(ǫ, η) = (ǫ2/4)× (2ω(ǫ2/2, η))1/2. 
The proof of Theorem 2 also relies on the auxiliary Lemma A1.
Lemma A1: Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then for any ǫ > 0, P
(||fwi − fwj ||2 ≤ ǫ) > 0.
Proof of Lemma A1: Following the first part of the proof of Lemma 2, Lusin’s theorem
implies that for any η > 0 there exists B, a closed subset of [0, 1] with measure of at least
1− η such that for any b ∈ B, there exists another closed subset C(b) of [0, 1] with measure
of at least 1− η, such that for any c ∈ C(b), f is uniformly continuous when restricted to
the set A′ = {(b, c) ∈ [0, 1]2 : b ∈ B, c ∈ C(b)}. That is, for all ǫ′ > 0 and u, v ∈ B there
exists a ω(ǫ′, η) > 0 such that |u− v| ≤ ω(ǫ′, η) implies that |f(u, t)− f(v, t)| ≤ ǫ′ for
t ∈ C(u) ∩ C(v), a set with Lebesgue measure at least 1− 2η.
So |u− v| ≤ ω(ǫ′, η) and u, v ∈ B imply that ||fu − fv||2 ≤ (ǫ′2(1− 2η) + 2η)1/2 ≤ ǫ′ +
√
2η.
Since wi, wj are independent with standard uniform marginals, ||fwi − fwj ||2 ≤ ǫ′ +
√
2η
with probability at least (1− 2η)ω(ǫ′, η). Now just choose ǫ′ < ǫ/2 and η < ǫ′2/2 to get
P
(||fwi − fwj ||2 ≤ ǫ) ≥ (1− ǫ2/8)ω(ǫ/2, ǫ2/8) > 0. 
Lemma 2 and Lemma A1 imply that for any ǫ > 0, P
(||pwi − pwj ||2 ≤ ǫ) > 0.
Theorem 2: Suppose Assumptions 1-5 hold. Then βˆ →p β.
Proof of Theorem 2: Let ui = yi − xiβ, δij = δ(wi, wj), rn = E
[
K
(
δ2ij
hn
)]
, and write
βˆ = β+
(
n−1∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
(xi − xj)′(xi − xj)K
(
δˆ2ij
hn
))−1(n−1∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
(xi − xj)′(ui − uj)K
(
δˆ2ij
hn
))
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I show
((
n
2
)
rn
)−1∑n−1
i=1
∑n
j=i+1(xi − xj)′(xi − xj)K
(
δˆ2ij
hn
)
→p 2Γ0. Similar arguments yield((
n
2
)
rn
)−1∑n−1
i=1
∑n
j=i+1(xi − xj)′(ui − uj)K
(
δˆ2ij
hn
)
→p 0, so that the claim follows from
Slutsky and the continuous mapping theorem. Since rn > 0 with probability one from
Lemma A1, both statistics are well-defined.
Let Dn =
((
n
2
)
rn
)−1∑
i
∑
j(xi − xj)′(xi − xj)K
(
δˆ2ij
hn
)
. By the mean value theorem
Dn =
((
n
2
)
rn
)−1∑
i
∑
j(xi − xj)′(xi − xj)
[
K
(
δ2ij
hn
)
+K ′
(
ιij
hn
)(
δˆ2ij−δ2ij
hn
)]
where {ιij}i 6=j is
the collection of intermediate values implied by that theorem. By Lemma 1
maxi 6=j
δˆ2ij−δ2ij
hn
= op
(
n−γ/4
)
and by Markov’s inequality K ′
(
ιij
hn
)
= op(rnn
γ/4), since
P
(
K ′
(
ιij
hn
)
≥ rnnγ/4
)
≤ E[|K
′(
ιij
hn
)|]
rnnγ/4
= O
(
n−γ/4
)
by choice of kernel density function. It
follows that Dn =
((
n
2
)
rn
)−1∑
i
∑
j(xi − xj)′(xi − xj)K
(
δ2ij
hn
)
+ op(1) since xi has finite
second moments and K ′(u) is bounded.
D′n :=
((
n
2
)
rn
)−1∑
i
∑
j(xi − xj)′(xi − xj)K
(
δ2ij
hn
)
is a second order U-statistic with kernel
depending on n, in the sense of Ahn and Powell (1993). In particular, their Lemma A.3
implies D′n = r
−1
n E
[
(xi − xj)′(xi − xj)K
(
δij
hn
)]
+ op(1) since nrn →∞. Measurability of f
and Assumption 4 further give
E
[
(xi − xj)′(xi − xj)K
(
δij
hn
)]
=
∫
E [(xi − xj)′(xi − xj)|δij = u]K
(
u
hn
)
dP (δij = u)du
=
∫
(Γ0 + op(1))K
(
u
hn
)
dP (δij = u)du = Γ0rn + op (rn)
in which dP (δij = u) denotes the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the measure P (δij ≤ u)
with respect to the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1]2,2 the second equality is due to
E [(xi − xj)′(xi − xj)|δij ≤ u] = Γ0 + op(1) by Lemma 2 and Assumptions 2 and 4. So
Dn = Γ0 + op(1).
2 That is, dP (δij = u) satisfies
∫
u∈A
dP (δij = u)du = P (δij ∈ A) for any Lebesgue measurable subset of
[0, 1]2. Existence of this derivative follows from measurability of f , see Dudley (2002), Theorem 5.5.4.
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A nearly identical argument yields
Un =
((
n
2
)
rn
)−1 n−1∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
(xi − xj)′(ui − uj)K
(
δˆij
hn
)
= op(1)
since E [(xi − xj)′(ui − uj)|d(wi, wj) = hn] = op(1) by Assumptions 3 and 4.(
βˆ − β
)
= D−1n Un = op(1) follows from Slutsky’s theorem. 
A.4 Lemmas and Theorems in Section 3.3.2
The proof of Theorem 3 relies on using discreteness of the network types to strengthen
Lemma 1 to auxiliary Lemma A2.
Lemma A2: Suppose Assumption 4 holds and fwi has finite support. Then there exists an
ǫ > 0 such that maxi 6=j δˆ2ij × 1{δˆ2ij ≤ ǫ/2} = op(n−1/2hn)
Proof of Lemma A2: The assumption that fwi has finite support implies there exists an
ǫ > 0 such that δ2ij1{δ2ij ≤ ǫ} = 0 and
(
pwiwt − pwjwt
)× 1{δ2ij ≤ ǫ/2} = 0 both with
probability one. For such an ǫ, write
δˆ2ij1{δˆ2ij ≤ ǫ/2} = δˆ2ij
(
1{δˆ2ij ≤ ǫ/2} − 1{δ2ij ≤ ǫ/2}
)
+ δˆ2ij1{δ2ij ≤ ǫ/2}
First, maxi 6=j
√
nh−1n δˆ
2
ij1{δ2ij ≤ ǫ/2} = op(1) because
(
pwiwt − pwjwt
)× 1{δ2ij ≤ ǫ/2} = 0,
Bernstein’s inequality, and the union bound imply
P
max
i,j,t
[
(n− 3)−1
∑
s 6=i,j,t
Dts(Dis −Djs)
]2
1{δ2ij ≤ ǫ/2} ≥ η
 ≤ 2n3 exp(−(n− 3)η
3
)
and averaging over t 6= i, j gives
P
(
max
i,j
√
nh−1n δˆ
2
ij1{δ2ij ≤ ǫ/2} ≥ η
)
≤ 2n3 exp
(−(n− 3)ηhn
3
√
n
)
= o(1)
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Second, since δ2ij ∈ (ǫ/4, 3ǫ/4) is a probability zero event,
√
nh−1n |δˆ2ij
(
1{δˆ2ij ≤ ǫ/2} − 1{δ2ij ≤ ǫ/2}
)
| ≤ 2√nh−1n × 1{|δˆ2ij − δ2ij| > |ǫ/2− δ2ij|}
≤ 2√nh−1n 1{|δˆ2ij − δ2ij | > ǫ/4}
and so maxi 6=j
√
nh−1n |δˆ2ij
(
1{δˆ2ij ≤ ǫ/2} − 1{δ2ij ≤ ǫ/2}
)
| = op(1) by previous arguments. 
Theorem 3: Suppose Assumptions 1-4 hold and fwi has finite support. Then
V
−1/2
3,n
(
βˆ − β
)
→d N (0, Ik)
where V3 = Γ
−1
0 Ω0Γ
−1
0 × s/n, Γ0 is as defined in Assumption 3, Ik is the k × k identity
matrix, and
s = P (||pi − pj ||2 = 0, ||pi − pk||2 = 0)/P (||pi − pj ||2 = 0)2
Ω0 = E [(xi − xj)′(xi − xk)(ui − uj)(ui − uk)| ||pi − pj||2 = 0, ||pi − pk||2 = 0]
Proof of Theorem 3: In the proof of Theorem 2, I demonstrate that Assumptions 1-5 are
sufficient for
1
m
∑
i
∑
j>i
(xi − xj)′(xi − xj)K
(
δˆ2ij
hn
)
→p 2Γ0E
[
K
(
δ2ij
hn
)]
where m = n(n− 1)/2 and δij = δ(wi, wj). Since the support of fwi is finite, E
[
K
(
δ2ij
hn
)]
= K(0)P (δij = 0) > 0 eventually.
As for the numerator, I follow the proof of Theorem 2 to write
Un =
1
m
∑
i
∑
j>i
∆ijK
(
δˆ2ij
hn
)
=
1
m
∑
i
∑
j>i
∆ij
[
K
(
δ2ij
hn
)
+K ′
(
ιij
hn
)(
δˆ2ij − δ2ij
hn
)
1{δˆ2ij ≤ hn}
]
where ιij is a mean value between δ
2
ij and δˆ
2
ij and ∆ij = (xi − xj)′ (ui − uj). I first show
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1
m
∑
i
∑
j>i∆ijlK
′
(
ιij
hn
)(
δˆ2ij−δ2ij
hn
)
1{δˆ2ij ≤ hn} = op
(
n−1/2
)
where ∆ijl is the lth component
of ∆ij . By Cauchy-Schwartz
1
m
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
∑
j>i
(
∆ijlK
′
(
ιij
hn
)(
δˆ2ij − δ2ij
hn
))∣∣∣∣∣
≤ K¯
′
m
(∑
i
∑
j>i
∆2ijl
)1/2
×
∑
i
∑
j>i
(
δˆ2ij − δ2ij
hn
)2
1{δˆ2ij ≤ hn}
1/2
where K¯ ′ = supu∈[0,1]K
′(u),
∑
i
∑
j>i∆
2
ijl = Op(m) since xi and ui have finite fourth
moments, and maxi 6=j
(
δˆ2ij−δ2ij
hn
)
1{δˆ2ij ≤ hn} = op
(
n−1/2
)
by Lemma A2.
It follows from this result that
Un =
1
m
∑
i
∑
j>i
∆ijK
(
δ2ij
hn
)
+ op
(
n−1/2
)
The first summand is a second order U-statistic with symmetric L2-integrable kernel, so by
Lemma A.3 of Ahn and Powell (1993)
√
n (Un − U)→ N (0, V )
where U = E
[
∆ijK
(
δ2ij
hn
)]
and for Zi = (xi, εi, wi)
V = lim
h→0
4E
[
E
[
∆ijK
(
δ2ij
h
)
| Zi
]
E
[
∆′ijK
(
δ2ij
h
)
| Zi
]]
= lim
h→0
4E
[
∆ij∆
′
ikK
(
δ2ij
h
)
K
(
δ2ik
h
)]
Since fwi has finite support, E[δ
2
ij |δ2ij ≤ ǫ] = 0 for some ǫ > 0, and so
U = E [∆ijK (0) 1{δij = 0}] = 0 for n sufficiently large such that hn ≤ ǫ. Similarly
V = 4Ω0K(0)
2P (δij = 0, δij = 0). So by Slutsky’s Theorem,
√
n
(
βˆ − β
)
→d N (0, V3)
where V3 = Γ
−1
0 Ω0Γ
−1
0 × s as claimed. 
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Lemma 3: Suppose Assumptions 1 and 5 hold. Then for almost every (wi, wj) pair
||pwi − pwj ||2 ≤ ||fwi − fwj ||2 ≤ 32 C
1
2+4α
6
(||pwi − pwj ||2) α1+2α
so long as ||pwi − pwj ||2 <
√
8C6K
−α.
Proof of Lemma 3: The first inequality is proven in the text and holds exactly for any
measurable f with ||f ||∞ ≤ 1 and every (wi, wj) pair. The proof of the second inequality
essentially mirrors the proof of Lemma 2, and so only a sketch is provded here. I first
demonstrate ||pwi − pwj ||2 ≤
(
4(4C6)
1/α
)−1
ǫ′
4α+2
α and
(
ǫ′
4C6
) 1
α
< K−1 imply
||fwi − fwj ||2 ≤
√
2ǫ′ with probability one.
Suppose
∣∣∫ fwi(s) (fwi(s)− fwj(s)) ds∣∣ > ǫ′. Then ∣∣∫ fτ (s) (fwi(s)− fwj(s)) ds∣∣ > ǫ′/2 for
τ ∈ [0, 1] so long as τ and wi are in the same block of the partition of [0, 1] and
C6|wi − τ |α < ǫ′/4. If
(
ǫ′
4C6
) 1
α
< K−1, then the measure of τ in [0, 1] that satisfty these
conditions is at least
(
ǫ′
4C6
) 1
α
. It follows that so long as
(
ǫ′
4C6
) 1
α
< K−1
∫ (∫
fτ (s)
(
fwi(s)− fwj (s)
)
ds
)2
dτ >
(
ǫ′
2
)2(
ǫ′
4C6
) 1
α
with probability one. The claim then follows from the last step in the proof of Lemma 2.
Now set ǫ =
√
2ǫ′. It follows that for almost every wi and wj, 2
2α+10
4α+2 C
1
4α+2
6 ||pi − pj ||
2α
4α+2
2 = ǫ
implies that ||fwi − fwj ||2 ≤ ǫ, so long as ǫ <
√
8C6K
−α/2. The claim then follows by noting
that 2
2α+10
4α+2 is bounded below 32 when α > 0. 
The proof of Theorem 4 relies on the following strengthening of auxiliary Lemma A1 to
auxiliary Lemma A3.
Lemma A3: Suppose Assumptions 1 and 5 hold. Then P
(||fwi − fwj ||2 ≤ ǫ) > C−1/α6 ǫ1/α,
so long as ǫ ≤ C6K−α
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Proof of Lemma A3: The proof of Lemma A3 essentially mirrors that of Lemma A1,
except Assumption 6 allows for the replacement of ω(ǫ, η) with
(
ǫ
C6
)1/α
. Notice that that
so long as K ≤
(
ǫ
C6
)− 1
α
the probability that wi and wj are in the same partition of [0, 1]
and that |wi − wj | ≤
(
ǫ
C6
)1/α
is bounded from below by
(
ǫ
C6
)1/α
. The claim follows. 
Theorem 4: Suppose Assumptions 1-3 and 5-6 hold. Then
V
−1/2
4,n
(
βˆ − βhn
)
→d N (0, Ik)
where V4,n = Γ
−1
0 ΩnΓ
−1
0 /n, Γ0 is as defined in Assumption 3, rn is as defined in Assumption
5, Ik is the k × k identity matrix, and
βhn = β + (Γ0)
−1E
[
(xi − xj)′(λ(wi)− λ(wj))K
( ||pi − pj ||2
hn
)]
/ (2rn)
Ωn =
4
r2n
E
[
∆i1j1∆
′
i1j2K
(
δ2i1j1
hn
)
K
(
δ2i2j2
hn
)]
+
1
r2nh
2
n
E
[
∆i1j1∆
′
i2j2
K ′
(
δ2i1j1
hn
)
K ′
(
δ2i2j2
hn
)(
Fi1j1t1s11s12 − δ2i1j1
) (
Fi2j2t1s21s22 − δ2i2j2
)]
+
4
r2nh
2
n
E
[
∆i1j1∆
′
i2j2
K ′
(
δ2i1j1
hn
)
K ′
(
δ2i2j2
hn
)(
Fi1j1t1s11s12 − δ2i1j1
) (
Fi2j2t2s11s22 − δ2i2j2
)]
with ∆ij = (xi − xj)′(ui − uj), ui = λ(wi) + εi, δij = δ(wi, wj), and
Fijts1s2 = f(wt, ws1)f(wt, ws2) (f(wi, ws1)− f(wj, ws1)) (f(wi, ws2)− f(wj, ws2)).
Proof of Theorem 4: The proof of Theorem 2 demonstrates that Assumptions 1-3 and 6
are sufficient for the denominator to converge in probability to 2Γ0. As for the numerator,
Un =
1(
n
2
)
rn
∑
i
∑
j>i
∆ijK
(
δˆ2ij
hn
)
=
1(
n
2
)
rn
∑
i
∑
j>i
∆ij
K (δ2ij
hn
)
+K ′
(
δ2ij
hn
)(
δˆ2ij − δ2ij
h2n
)
+K ′′
(
ιij
h2n
)(
δˆ2ij − δ2ij
h2n
)2
where ιij is the intermediate value between δˆ
2
ij and δ
2
ij suggested by Taylor and the mean
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value theorem. First, I show that
1(
n
2
)
rn
∑
i
∑
j>i
∆ijK
′′
(
ιij
hn
)(
δˆ2ij − δ2ij
hn
)2
= op
(
n−1/2
)
Let sn = n
−1/2h4nrn. Since δij ≤ C|wi − wj|α by the first part of Lemma 2 and Assumption
5, rn ≥ KC−1/αh1/αn for K = lim infh→0E
[
K
(
δij
h
)
|δij ≤ h
]
> 0 by Lemma A2. Since
n1/2−γh4+1/αn →∞ for some γ > 0 by Assumption 9, n1−γsn →∞, and so Lemma 1 implies
that supi 6=j
(
δˆ2ij−δ2ij√
s
)2
= op(1) or supi 6=j
(
δˆ2ij−δ2ij
h2n
√
rn
)2
= op
(
n−1/2
)
. It follows that
1(
n
2
)
rn
∑
i
∑
j>i
∆ijK
′′
(
ιij
hn
)(
δˆ2ij − δ2ij
hn
)2
≤ K¯
′′(
n
2
)∑
i
∑
j>i
∆ij × op
(
n−1/2
)
where K¯ ′′ = supu∈[0,1]K
′′(u) and the last line is op
(
n−1/2
)
because xi and ui have finite
fourth moments. It follows from this first step that
Un =
1(
n
2
)
rn
∑
i
∑
j>i
∆ij
[
K
(
δ2ij
hn
)
+K ′
(
δ2ij
hn
)(
δˆ2ij − δ2ij
hn
)]
+ op
(
n−1/2
)
Second, I show that
Un =
1(
n
5
)2
rn
∑
i
∑
j>i
∑
t>j
∑
s1>t
∑
s2>s1
∆ij
[
K
(
δ2ij
hn
)
+
1
hn
K ′
(
δ2ij
hn
)(
Fijts1s2 − δ2ij
)]
+ op
(
n−1/2
)
where Fijts1s2 = fts1fts2(fis1 − fjs1)(fis2 − fjs2). Let
δ˜2ij =
(
n−j
3
)−1∑
t>j
∑
s1>t
∑
s2>s1
Fijts1s2. Then
Un =
1(
n
2
)
rn
∑
i
∑
j>i
∆ij
[
K
(
δ2ij
hn
)
+K ′
(
δ2ij
hn
)(
δ˜2ij − δ2ij
hn
)]
+
1(
n
2
)
rn
∑
i
∑
j>i
∆ij
[
K ′
(
δ2ij
hn
)(
δˆ2ij − δ˜2ij
hn
)]
+ op
(
n−1/2
)
and the second summand is op(n
−1/2) by Chebyshev’s inequality, since it has mean zero
59
and variance
1(
n
2
)2
n6r2nh
2
n
E
[∑
i1
∑
i2
∑
j1
∑
j2
∑
t1
∑
t2
∑
s11
∑
s12
∑
s21
∑
s22
∆i1j1∆
′
i2j2K
′
(
δ2i1j1
hn
)
K ′
(
δ2i2j2
hn
)
× (Di1j1t1s11s12 − Fi1j1t1s11s12)× (Di2j2t2s21s22 − Fi2j2t2s21s22)
]
where Dijts1s2 = Dts1Dts2(Dis1 −Djs1)(Dis2 −Djs2). To see that this variance is o (n−1),
note that unless two elements from the set {i1, j1, t1, s11, s12} equal two in
{i2, j2, t2, s21, s22}, {ηt1s11, ηt1s12 , ηi1s11, ηj1s11 , ηi1s12, ηj1s12} is independent of
{ηt2s21 , ηt2s22 , ηi2s21 , ηj2s21 , ηi2s22 , ηj2s22} and so
E
[
[Di1j1t1s11s12 − Fi1j1t1s11s12 ]× [Di2j2t2s21s22 − Fi2j2t2s21s22 ] |Zi1j1t1s11s12 , Zi2j2t2s21s22
]
= 0
where Zi = {xi, wi, νi} and Zijts1s2 = {Zi, Zj, Zt, Zs1, Zs2}. Since K ′
(
δ2i1j1
h
)
is Op(rn),
nh4n →∞ implies that this variance is o (n−1) and so the second summand is op
(
n−1/2
)
.
Let
U ′n =
1(
n
5
)2
rn
∑
i
∑
j>i
∑
t>j
∑
s1>t
∑
s2>s1
∆ij
[
K
(
δ2ij
hn
)
+
1
hn
K ′
(
δ2ij
hn
)(
Fijts1s2 − δ2ij
)]
= Un + op
(
n−1/2
)
U ′n is a 5th order U-statistic which can be represented by the following iid sum (see for
instance Lemma 3.2 of Powell, Stock, and Stoker 1989)
Un = E[Un] +
2
nrn
n∑
τ=1
(
E
[
∆τjK
(
δ2τj
hn
)
|Zτ
]
−E[Un]
)
+
1
nrnhn
n∑
τ=1
E
[
∆ijK
′
(
δ2ij
hn
)(
Fijτs1s2 − δ2ij
) |Zτ]
+
2
nrnhn
n∑
τ=1
E
[
∆ijK
′
(
δ2ij
hn
)(
Fijtτs2 − δ2ij
) |Zτ]+ op (n−1/2)
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where E[Un] = r
−1
n E
[
∆ijK
(
δ2ij
hn
)]
and Zτ = {xτ , wτ , ντ}. In particular, Un can be
represented asymptotically by an iid sum of random variables, so by the Lindeberg Central
Limit Theorem
V ′′−1/2n (Un − E[Un])→d N (0, Ik)
where for a collection of ten distinct agents {i1, i2, j1, j2, t1, t2, s11, s12, s21s,22 }
V ′′n =
4
r2n
E
[
∆i1j1∆
′
i1j2K
(
δ2i1j1
hn
)
K
(
δ2i2j2
hn
)]
+
1
r2nh
2
n
E
[
∆i1j1∆
′
i2j2
K ′
(
δ2i1j1
hn
)
K ′
(
δ2i2j2
hn
)(
Fi1j1t1s11s12 − δ2i1j1
) (
Fi2j2t1s21s22 − δ2i2j2
)]
+
4
r2nh
2
n
E
[
∆i1j1∆
′
i2j2
K ′
(
δ2i1j1
hn
)
K ′
(
δ2i2j2
hn
)(
Fi1j1t1s11s12 − δ2i1j1
) (
Fi2j2t2s11s22 − δ2i2j2
)]
since E[Un]→p 0 by Theorem 2. It follows from Slutsky’s Theorem that
V
−1/2
4,n
(
βˆ − β − (2Γ0)−1E [Un]
)
→d N (0, Ik)
where E[Un] = E
[
∆ijK
(
δ2ij
hn
)]
as claimed. 
A.5 Theorems in Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4
Theorem 5: Suppose Assumptions 1-3 and 5-7 hold, and L > ζα/(2θ(1 + 2α)). Then
V
−1/2
5,n
(
β¯L − β
)→d N (0, Ik)
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where V5,n =
∑L
l1=1
∑L
l2=1
al1al2Γ
−1
0 Ωn,l1l2Γ
−1
0 /n, Γ0 is as defined in Assumption 3,
rnl = E
[
K
(
δ2ij
clhn
)]
, Ik is the k × k identity matrix, and
Ωn,l1l2 =
4
rnl1rnl2
E
[
∆i1j1∆
′
i1j2
K
(
δ2i1j1
cl1hn
)
K
(
δ2i2j2
cl2hn
)]
+
1
rnl1cl1rnl2cl2h
2
n
E
[
∆i1j1∆
′
i2j2
K ′
(
δ2i1j1
cl1hn
)
K ′
(
δ2i2j2
cl2hn
)(
Fi1j1t1s11s12 − δ2i1j1
) (
Fi2j2t1s21s22 − δ2i2j2
)]
+
4
rnl1cl1rnl2cl2h
2
n
E
[
∆i1j1∆
′
i2j2
K ′
(
δ2i1j1
cl1hn
)
K ′
(
δ2i2j2
cl2hn
)(
Fi1j1t1s11s12 − δ2i1j1
) (
Fi2j2t2s11s22 − δ2i2j2
)]
Proof of Theorem 5: Since β¯L =
∑L
l=1 alβˆClhn, a straightforward extension of the proof
of Theorem 4 (and the continuous mapping theorem) implies that
V
−1/2
5,n
(
β¯L − β¯L,hn
)
= V
−1/2
5,n
L∑
l=1
al
(
βˆClhn − βClhn
)
→d N (0, Ik)
where β¯L,h =
∑L
l=1 alβClh is the pseudo-truth associated with βL, which can also be written
β¯L,h = β +
L∑
l1=1
L∑
l2=1
al1 (2Γ0)
−1Cl2 (cl1h)
l2/θ + op
(
n−1/2
)
= β + (2Γ0)
−1∑
l2
Cl2
[∑
l1
al1c
l2/θ
l1
]
hl2/θ + op
(
n−1/2
)
since
∑
l2
al2 = 1 by choice of {a1, ..., aL}. The second summand is 0 because, {a1, ..., aL}
also satisfies
[∑
l1
al1c
l2/θ
l1
]
= 0 for all l2 ∈ {1, ..., L}. The claim follows. 
Theorem 6: Suppose Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then
(
Γˆ−1hn Ωˆn,hn,hnΓˆ
−1
h − nV4,n
)
→p 0 and(∑L
l1=1
∑L
l2=1
al1al2Γˆ
−1
cl1hn
Ωˆn,cl1hn,cl2hnΓˆ
−1
cl2hn
− nV5,n
)
→p 0
Proof of Theorem 6: I prove the second claim, which includes the first as a special case.
The proof of Theorem 2 demonstrates that Assumptions 1-4 are sufficient for
r−1n,cΓˆchn = 2Γ0 + op(1) for any c > 0 where δij = δ(wi, wj) and rn,c =
(
E
[
K
(
δij
chn
)])
. It
remains to be shown that (rn,c1rn,c2)
−1 Ωˆc1hn,c2hn converges to Ωnc1c2 for any c1, c2 > 0. I
consider the three terms that make up Ωˆc1hn,c2hn seperately.
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The first term is 1
n3rn,c1rn,c2
∑n
i=1
∑n
j1=1
∑n
j2=1
∆ˆij1∆ˆ
′
ij2
K
(
δˆij1
h1
)
K
(
δˆij2
h2
)
, where
∆ˆij = (xi − xj)′(uˆi − uˆj) and uˆi = yi − xiβˆ. Lemma 2 and Theorem 2 imply that
δˆij = δij + o(1) and uˆi = ui + o(1) where ui = yi − xiβ, and so the term converges to
1
n3rn,c1rn,c2
∑n
i=1
∑n
j1=1
∑n
j2=1
∆ij1∆
′
ij2
K
(
δij1
h1
)
K
(
δij2
h2
)
by the continuous mapping
theorem, which is a third order V-statistic in the sense of Ahn and Powell (1993), and thus
converges in probability to 1
rn,c1rn,c2
E
[
∆ij1∆
′
ij2
K
(
δij1
h1
)
K
(
δij2
h2
)]
.
The second term is
1
n5c1h1rn,c1c2h2rn,c2
n∑
i1=1
n∑
i2=1
n∑
j1=1
n∑
j2=1
n∑
t=1
∆ˆi1j1∆ˆi2j2K
′
(
δˆ2i1j1
c1h1
)
K ′
(
δˆ2i2j2
c2h2
)(
Fˆi1j1t − δˆ2i1j1
)(
Fˆi2j2t − δˆ2i2j2
)
where Fˆijt =
1
n2
∑n
s1=1
∑n
s2=1
Dts1Dts2 (Dis1 −Djs1) (Dis2 −Djs2). By previous arguments
this converges to the fifth-order V-statistic
1
n5c1h1rn,c1c2h2rn,c2
n∑
i1=1
n∑
i2=1
n∑
j1=1
n∑
j2=1
n∑
t=1
∆i1j1∆i2j2K
′
(
δ2i1j1
c1h1
)
K ′
(
δ2i2j2
c2h2
)(
Fi1j1t − δ2i1j1
) (
Fi2j2t − δ2i2j2
)
where Fijt = E [Dts1Dts2 (Dis1 −Djs1) (Dis2 −Djs2) |wi, wj, wt] is the probability limit of
Fˆijt. The second term thus converges to
1
c1hnrn,c1c2h2rn,c2
E
[
∆i1j1∆i2j2K
′
(
δ2i1j1
c1h1
)
K ′
(
δ2i2j2
c2h2
)(
Fi1j1t − δ2i1j1
) (
Fi2j2t − δ2i2j2
)]
The third term is
4
n5h1h2
n∑
i1=1
n∑
i2=1
n∑
j1=1
n∑
j2=1
n∑
t=1
∆ˆi1j1∆ˆi2j2K
′
(
δˆi1j1
h1
)
K ′
(
δˆi2j2
h2
)(
Fˆ ′i1j1t − δˆ2i1j1
)(
Fˆ ′i2j2t − δˆ2i2j2
)
where Fˆ ′ijs1 =
1
n2
∑n
t=1
∑n
s2=1
Dts1Dts2 (Dis1 −Djs1) (Dis2 −Djs2). By previous arguments
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this converges to the fifth order V-statistic
4
n5h1h2
n∑
i1=1
n∑
i2=1
n∑
j1=1
n∑
j2=1
n∑
t=1
∆i1j1∆i2j2K
′
(
δi1j1
h1
)
K ′
(
δi2j2
h2
)(
F ′i1j1t − δ2i1j1
) (
F ′i2j2t − δ2i2j2
)
where F ′ijs1 = E [Dts1Dts2 (Dis1 −Djs1) (Dis2 −Djs2) |wi, wj, ws1] is the probability limit of
Fˆ ′ijs1. The third term thus converges to
1
c1hnrn,c1c2h2rn,c2
E
[
∆i1j1∆i2j2K
′
(
δi1j1
h1
)
K ′
(
δi2j2
h2
)(
F ′i1j1t − δ2i1j1
) (
F ′i2j2t − δ2i2j2
)]
The claim then follows from the continuous mapping theorem. 
Theorem 7: Suppose Assumptions 1-3 and 5-6 hold. Then
1
R
∑R
r=1
(
βˆr − βˆ
)(
βˆr − βˆ
)′
→p V4,n and 1R
∑R
r=1
(
β¯Lr − β¯L
) (
β¯Lr − β¯L
)′ →p V5,n as
n,R→∞.
Proof of Theorem 7: The first claim essentially follows from the asymptotically linear
representation for βˆ given in the proof of Theorem 4 and by Theorem 2.2 of
Bickel and Freedman (1981). The second follows by identical arguments.
The proof of Theorem 4 indicates that under Assumptions 1-3 and 5-6
βˆ − βhn =
1
n
n∑
τ=1
(2Γ0)
−1 gn(Zτ ) + op
(
n−1/2
)
where Zτ = {Xτ , wτ , ετ} and
gn(Zτ ) = 2
(
E
[
∆τjK
(
δ2τj
hn
)
|Zτ
]
− E[Un]
)
+ E
[
∆ijK
′
(
δ2ij
hn
)(
Fijτs1s2 − δ2ij
) |Zτ]
+ 2E
[
∆ijK
′
(
δ2ij
hn
)(
Fijtτs2 − δ2ij
) |Zτ]
By definition of βˆr
βˆr − βˆ = (2Γ0)−1
(
1
n
n∑
τ ′=1
gn(Zτ ′r)− 1
n
n∑
τ=1
gn(Zτ )
)
+ op
(
n−1/2
)
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in which Zτ ′r = Ziτ ′r . By Theorem 2.2 (a) of Bickel and Freedman (1981),
{√n ( 1
n
∑n
τ ′=1 gn(Zτ ′r)− 1n
∑n
τ=1 gn(Zτ)
)}Rr=1 is a conditionally independent (given
{Zτ}nτ=1) sequence with entries weakly convergent (as n→∞) to a k-dimensional normal
distribution with mean 0 and variance E [gn(Z1)gn(Z1)
′]. The sufficient condition for this
Theorem to hold is for E [||gn(Z1)||2] to be finite, which follows from Assumption 1 and the
choice of kernel density function in Assumption 4. Since σ({Zτ}nτ=1) is degenerate in the
limit, the usual strong law of large numbers gives that R→∞ implies
1
R
∑R
r=1
(
βˆr − βˆ
)(
βˆr − βˆ
)′
converges in probability to E [g(Z1)g(Z1)
′] /n = V4,n so long as
E [||gn(Z1)||4] <∞. This last condition also follows from Assumptions 1 and 4, which
completes the proof. 
A.6 Theorems in Section 3.4
Theorem 7: Suppose Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then E
[(
λ̂(wi)− λ(wi)
)2]
→p 0, where the
expectation is taken with respect to wi.
Proof of Theorem 7 Let λi, λˆi, and δit shorthand λ(wi), λ̂(wi), and δ(wi, wt)
respectively. Recall that λˆi =
∑n
t=1
(
yt − xtβˆ
)
K
(
δˆ2it
hn
)
/
∑n
t=1K
(
δˆ2it
hn
)
. First consider the
denominator. Along the lines of the proof of Theorem 2, Lemma 1 and continuous
differentiability of K implies
max
i=1,...,n
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
t=1
K
(
δˆ2it
hn
)
− 1
n
n∑
t=1
K
(
δ2it
hn
)∣∣∣∣∣ = op (n−γ/4hn)
while Hoeffding and Boole’s inequality gives
max
i=1,...,n
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
t=1
K
(
δ2it
hn
)
− E
[
K
(
δ2it
hn
)
|wi
]∣∣∣∣∣ = op
(√
logn
n
)
so by the triangle inequality and choice of bandwidth sequence
max
i=1,...,n
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
t=1
K
(
δˆ2it
hn
)
−E
[
K
(
δ2it
hn
)
|wi
]∣∣∣∣∣ = op (n−γ/4hn)
Applying the same logic to the numerator also yields
max
i=1,...,n
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
t=1
(
yt − xtβˆ
)
K
(
δˆ2it
hn
)
−E
[(
yt − xtβˆ
)
K
(
δ2it
hn
)
|wi
]∣∣∣∣∣ = op (n−γ/4hn)
Let k = infu∈[0,.5]K(u) with k > 0 by choice of kernel in Assumption 4. Then
E
[
K
(
δ2it
hn
)
|wi
]
> kP (δ2it ≤ hn/2|wi) > 0 with probability one by Lemma A1, so the
continuous mapping theorem implies
max
i=1,...,n
∣∣∣∣∣∣λ̂i −
E
[
λtK
(
δit
hn
)
|wi
]
E
[
K
(
δit
hn
)
|wi
] + E
[
xtK
(
δit
hn
)
|wi
] (
βˆ − β
)
E
[
K
(
δit
hn
)
|wi
]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = op (n−γ/4hn)
Since xi has finite second moments,
E[xtK( δithn )|wi]
E[K( δithn )|wi]
is uniformly bounded with probability
one, and so maxi=1,...,n
E[xtK( δithn )|wi](βˆ−β)
E[K( δithn )|wi]
= op(1) by Theorem 2. It follows that
E
[(
λˆi − λi
)2]
= E

E
[
(λt − λi)K
(
δit
hn
)
|wi
]
E
[
K
(
δit
hn
)
|wi
]
2
+ op (n−γ/4hn)
= E

∫ E [(λi − λt) |δit = u, wi]K
(
u
hn
)
dP (δit = u|wi)∫
K
(
u
hn
)
dP (δit = u|wi)
2
+ op (n−γ/4hn)
in which dP (δit = u|wi) refers to the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the measure
P (δij ≤ u|wi) with respect to the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1] (see proof of Theorem 2 for
more details). This term is op (1) by Assumption 3 and Lemma 2. 
Theorem 8: Suppose Assumptions 1-4 and 8 hold. Let λˆS = {λ̂(wi)}i∈S for some finite
collection of agents S. Then
V
−1/2
8,n
(
λˆS − λS
)
→d N
(
0, I|S|
)
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where λS = {λ(wi)}i∈S, V8,n = diag({V8,n,i}i∈S), and
V8,n,i =
n∑
t=1
((
utK
(
δit
hn
)
− r′n,i
)
− r
′
n,i
rn,i
(
K
(
δit
hn
)
− rn,i
))2
/(nr2n,i)
Proof of Theorem 8 The proof of Theorem 8 closely follows that of Theorem 4, and so
only a sketch is provided here. Let λi, λˆi, and δit shorthand λ(wi), λ̂(wi), and δ(wi, wt)
respectively. Then
(
λˆirn,i − r′n,i
)
=
1
n
n∑
t=1
(
uˆtK
(
δˆit
hn
)
− r′n,i
)
− r
′
n,i
rn,i
(
K
(
δˆit
hn
)
− rn,i
)
+ remn,i
=
1
n
n∑
t=1
(
utK
(
δit
hn
)
− r′n,i
)
− r
′
n,i
rn,i
(
K
(
δit
hn
)
− rn,i
)
+ op
(√
rn,i
n
)
+ remn,i
where rn,i = E
[
K
(
δit
hn
)
|wi
]
, r′n,i = E
[
utK
(
δit
hn
)
|wi
]
, and remi,n is an error that is
stochastically small (i.e. the remainder from a first order Taylor approximation). See the
proof of Theorem 3 for more details). The second line follows from the fact that |βˆ − β|
and maxi 6=j |δˆij − δij | are both op
(
(nrn,i)
−1/2
)
.
It follows from the Lindeberg Central Limit Theorem that
λˆirn,i−r′n,i√
nV8,n,i
→d N (0, 1) where
V8,n,i = n
−1
n∑
t=1
((
utK
(
δit
hn
)
− r′n,i
)
− r
′
n,i
rn,i
(
K
(
δit
hn
)
− rn,i
))2
and since bn,in/rn,i →p 0 for all i ∈ S, λˆi−λi√
nV8,n,i/r2n,i
→d N (0, 1). The claim follows by the
fact that the entries of λˆS are asymptotically independent. 
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